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In 1999, the United States was shocked 
when two students at Columbine High School 
in Colorado shot and killed 12 students and one 
teacher, injured 24 more, and then killed them-
selves. The Columbine shooting was hardly the first 
major incident of violence in the United States, but 
for a number of reasons, Columbine was particu-
larly distressing, and it captured the attention of the 
American people.
First, unlike other high-profile crimes with 
multiple victims, the Columbine massacre did 
not involve criminals whose motive was financial 
profit, terrorists trying to obtain the release of their 
imprisoned brethren, or political radicals or zealots. 
The Columbine shooters’ motivations were not the 
motives of “traditional” criminals.
Furthermore, the Columbine shootings shocked 
the nation because they hit close to home for people 
who were not accustomed to worrying about vio-
lent crime. Columbine was an upper-middle-class 
suburban high school with a high graduation rate, 
and large majorities of Columbine graduates went 
on to college. Thus, unlike the case with many other 
types of crime, average Americans could not look 
at the Columbine shooting and dismiss it as some-
thing that could never happen in their community.
Because the Columbine incident was something 
new, it prompted new thinking by police depart-
ments about how they should respond. More than 
a decade later, this process of developing new police 
policies, practices, and training for “active shooter” 
events is continuing. 
Introduction
“Columbine was a wake-up call.”
—Montgomery County, MD Police Chief Thomas Manger
In the Columbine incident, police from vari-
ous Denver-area agencies responded but did not 
enter the school to stop the shooters for more than 
30 minutes. That reflected their training, which was 
based on the concepts of containing the situation 
and waiting for SWAT team members to arrive, 
mobilize, and respond. 
This type of training reflected the thinking at 
the time. And it was appropriate for hostage inci-
dents or other scenarios in which it made sense to 
wait for a SWAT team to respond, because SWAT 
Montgomery County, MD Police Chief 
Thomas Manger
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personnel are better equipped and trained in spe-
cial tactics than are patrol officers. However, Col-
umbine did not involve hostage takers; it involved 
two youths intent on quickly killing people at 
random. Columbine brought a realization by law 
enforcement leaders that a much faster response 
was needed for active-shooter incidents.
Columbine brought about a sea change in police 
tactics. “Contain and negotiate” may be appropriate 
for hostage incidents or situations where a person is 
barricaded in a room and unable to harm victims. 
But it is not appropriate for active shooter incidents. 
Columbine resulted in new approaches in which 
patrol officers are being trained to respond to active 
shooters as quickly as possible. 
These new policies undoubtedly have saved 
many lives. Following is how the Associated Press 
described one of the most recent events, an attack at 
a supermarket in Elkhart, Indiana on Jan. 15, 2014:
A deadly shooting at an Indiana grocery store 
could have been much worse if not for the quick 
actions of two police officers who relied on training 
that has become commonplace since the 1999 Col-
umbine shootings. Cody Skipper and Jason Tripp 
arrived at the Elkhart store within three minutes 
and needed less than 60 seconds to fatally shoot a 
gunman who had killed two people and was threat-
ening a third.1
These new approaches to active shooter events 
have not been easy to implement, and difficult 
issues have arisen in connection with active-shooter 
protocols. 
For example, a faster response is more dan-
gerous to responding officers. Patrol officers who 
quickly move to confront an active shooter face a 
high likelihood of being shot themselves. 
In addition, active shooter incidents are danger-
ous, uncertain, and quickly changing. Specialized 
teams such as SWAT units receive complex tactical 
training in how to respond to dynamic situations 
with many moving parts. It is difficult to shrink this 
type of training to an abbreviated, short-course for-
mat suitable for all line officers. 
Thankfully, most officers will never need to use 
active shooter training. But it is important that they 
receive some training, because on the rare occasion 
when a patrol officer is one of the first to arrive at 
a mass shooting incident, the stakes could not be 
higher. 
There have been many active shooter inci-
dents in the United States since Columbine, and 
police agencies continue to modify their policies 
and training to reflect the lessons that are learned 
from each new tragedy. This report summarizes the 
state of the field as of 2014. The Police Executive 
Research Forum conducted research on these issues 
and held a one-day Summit in Washington, D.C., in 
which an overflow crowd of more than 225 police 
chiefs and other officials discussed the changes that 
have occurred, and where they are going from here.
1. “Response to store shooting confirms police tactics.” Associated Press, Jan. 17, 2014. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
response-store-shooting-confirms-police-tactics
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Analysis of 84 Active Shooter Incidents 
Since 2000
One of the first presentations at PERF’s 
Summit on Active Shooters was made by Prof. J. Pete 
Blair of Texas State University, who conducts train-
ing on active shooter response and other topics at the 
Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Train-
ing Center (ALERRT) at Texas State University. He is 
one of the authors of the 2013 book, Active Shooter 
Events and Response.2
Professor Blair shared the results of a major 
research project that he conducted, in which he and 
his colleagues analyzed every major active shooter 
event they could identify from 2000 to 2010. 
Solo Entry to an Active Shooting Event 
Is Dangerous
By Prof. J. Pete Blair
Texas State University
The research I’m going to summarize now, which 
I conducted with M. Hunter Martaindale, was 
designed to help police learn from past active 
shooter events, so we can be better prepared for 
what’s going to come in the future. 
We wanted to get the big picture. We focused on 
active shooter events since the year 2000. We chose 
the year 2000 because Columbine was in 1999, and 
that event brought the sea change in the way police 
respond to these events. And we decided to stop at 
2. http://www.amazon.com/Active-Shooter-Events-Response-Blair/dp/1466512296
the year 2010, because when these events happen, 
it can take some time for the information that we 
were seeking to emerge from investigations and 
court proceedings.
Prof. J. Pete Blair, Texas State University
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WE ANALYZED  
84 ACTIVE SHOOTER EVENTS
We identified 84 events in that 2000-2010 time 
frame. Our criteria for defining an active shooter 
event were that the event had to involve one or more 
persons killing or attempting to kill multiple peo-
ple in an area or areas occupied by multiple unre-
lated individuals. At least one of the victims had 
to be unrelated to the shooter. We excluded gang-
related shootings because that’s a different kind of 
phenomenon.
Our sources of information about the 84 active 
shooter events were reports from the investigat-
ing agencies, the Supplemental Homicide Reports 
(SHR) produced by the FBI, and news media stories.
If you look at the breakdown year to year, you’ll 
see the number of events starting at a relatively low 
level in the 2000s and then ramping up in 2009 and 
2010. By the way, we are finding that 2011 and 2012 
were much like 2009 and 2010; we have seen more 
of these events happening lately. 
Next, I wanted to take a look at where these 
attacks occur. Since Sandy Hook, there has been a 
lot of attention on active shooters at schools, and 
schools are certainly important, accounting for 29 
of the 84 incidents. 
But I found that if you combine active shooter 
events at business locations—offices, factories, 
warehouses, and retail settings—the total of all of 
these events at business locations was more numer-
ous, with 31 active shooting events. 
“In all of the solo entries we identified 
where the scene was still hot, one-third 
of the police officers who made that solo 
entry were shot.”
—Prof. J. Pete Blair
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Source: Active Shooter Events and Response, CRC Press, 2013.
And 14 active shooter events occurred in out-
door public areas. 
It’s also noteworthy that 80 percent of the events 
happened at one location, but 20 percent of the 
attackers went mobile. Most of the time, that’s on 
foot—they walk out of the building they’re in, go to 
another building and continue the attack there.
HOW DID THE EVENTS END?
Next, I considered how the active shooter events 
were resolved. We defined resolution as the shooter 
being shot or subdued or otherwise stopped, or 
the shooter stopping the shooting and leaving the 
location. 
You can see from the diagram (see page 5) 
that in about half the events, the shooting stopped 
before police arrived at the scene. The shooter either 
committed suicide, or left the scene, or was shot or 
subdued by victims at the scene. 
These events generally happened very quickly. 
The most common resolution, in the events that stop 
before the police arrive, is that the shooter commits 
suicide. What we tend to see is that the attackers 
have an initial burst of violence. They have so many 
victims in front of them; they attack those victims; 
they run out of victims; and they kill themselves. 
That’s probably not very surprising for most of 
the police chiefs in this room. What may be a little 
bit surprising is the number of situations where the 
people on scene subdue or shoot the attacker them-
selves. That’s what happened in nearly 40 percent of 
all the incidents that were resolved before the police 
arrived. I think that’s important for the discussion 
about civilian response, which I’ll discuss later (see 
page 37). And in about 10 percent of the events that 
stop before the police arrive, the attacker just leaves.
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So what happens in the incidents that are still 
continuing when the police arrive? You see it’s 
roughly 50–50 as to whether the police shoot or 
use other force against the attacker, or the attacker 
stops the shooting by surrendering or committing 
suicide. The most common resolution in these cases 
is that the police stop the attacker, and the second 
most common result is that the attacker commits 
suicide.
SOLO ENTRY IS QUITE DANGEROUS
Here is something important to consider. People 
talk about how the response to active shooters has 
changed since Columbine, and officers are encour-
aged to do a “solo entry” if they are the first on the 
scene. And in some of the discussions I’ve heard, 
the rationale behind it seems to be, “Well, it’s really 
not that dangerous, because the attacker usually 
kills himself.”
So I wanted to take a look at it from our data 
and see if the situation really is clear when there’s 
one officer going in by himself or herself. And the 
first thing I found is that in 57 percent of the cases 
where there’s single-officer entry, the scene is still 
active. There is still gunfire ringing out. The attacker 
is still killing people. That’s a higher number than 
what you see in the overall data, but it makes sense 
because the solo officer typically is getting to the 
scene faster than the cases where multiple officers 
arrive at once. 
Here’s what happens if the scene is still active 
and an officer goes in. Sixty-two percent of the time, 
the officer shoots the attacker. Another 13 percent, 
the officer otherwise subdues the attacker. The 
remaining 25 percent of the time, the suspect kills 
himself. 
So 75 percent of the time when the solo officer 
goes in and the scene is still hot, the officer is tak-
ing direct action against the attacker. 
And here’s an even more important statistic: 
In all of the solo entries we identified where the 
scene was still hot, one-third of the police officers 
who made that solo entry were shot.
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Source: Active Shooter Events and Response, CRC Press, 2013.
6 — Analysis of 84 Active Shooter Incidents Since 2000
I’m not opposed to solo officer entry, but I 
think the officers ought to be informed explicitly 
about what the risks are, if they’re going to take 
that risk. 
TYPES OF WEAPONS  
USED BY ACTIVE SHOOTERS
I want to turn now and talk about how the attackers 
are equipped. Obviously that’s going to be important 
in deciding what equipment police need to bring. 
Most of the time—in 60 percent of the cases—the 
most powerful weapon they have is a pistol. But 27 
percent of the time, they have a rifle, and 9 percent 
of the time, they have a shotgun. So we are seeing 
long firearms being used by these people as well as 
handguns. 
And in 41 percent of the events where we were 
able to identify the weapons carried, the attacker 
carried multiple weapons. 
The attackers wore body armor 4 percent of the 
time, so it’s not common but it does happen. And 
attackers brought improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) in 2 percent of the incidents. 
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES 
RESPONSE
Another big issue is EMS response. The EMS 
national standard is that EMS workers will not enter 
scenes that are not secure. And that makes sense; 
they don’t want their own people to become victims. 
But the problem we face in an active shooter sit-
uation is that when one of these events happens, you 
get many people calling in, giving different descrip-
tions of the shooter. So the police go in and stop 
the killing, and they call dispatch and say, “I’ve got a 
shooter down,” and they provide a description. But 
the description does not match all of the descrip-
tions given by 911 callers, so you can’t be sure that 
there isn’t another shooter on the scene. 
And so what happens? Police have to do a 
systematic search before they can say the scene is 
secure. And even after the shooter is down, calls 
keep coming in with people saying, “I saw the 
shooter at this location” or “My buddy just called 
me and said he saw the shooter.” That kind of thing 
is very common during these events. 
So you can imagine how long it may take to do 
a systematic search if you’re in a large office building 
or a shopping mall. It may take hours, and what’s 
happening during that time? People who have been 
shot and wounded are bleeding out and dying.3 
So it falls upon our first responders who are 
inside the scene, the law enforcement officers, to 
provide immediate lifesaving care to people. That 
can mean stabilizing them long enough until the 
scene can be cleared and EMS can be brought in, 
it or can mean transporting people out of the scene 
to EMS. 
And it can mean training police officers in 
triage and in applying immediate lifesaving tech-
niques like tourniquets and occlusive dressings that 
help control bleeding. In my opinion, tourniquets 
should be standard issue with every police officer in 
their kit—not just for active shooter incidents, but 
for everyday emergencies. In San Antonio last year, 
we had a police officer who was handling a traffic 
stop when a drunk driver hit him, cutting off his 
leg. Another officer immediately applied a tourni-
quet and saved the officer’s life.
OFFICERS MUST BE TRAINED 
TO EXPECT A FIGHT
Officers have to be ready to fight. They can’t go in 
with the assumption that “most of the time, these 
guys kill themselves, so I’ll probably be OK.” In 
many of these events, the attackers are looking to 
fight, and so our officers need to be ready to fight. 
We have seen attackers barricade themselves in, 
so we need police to have the skills and techniques 
and equipment to get in and stop the killing. 
Another thing to think about is whether you 
are ready to operate outdoors. Seventeen percent 
of these incidents we studied happened outdoors, 
3. In Mass Attacks, New Advice Lets Medics Rush In. New York Times, December 7, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
12/08/us/in-mass-attacks-new-advice-lets-medics-rush-in.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0
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and technique, formations, and other things must 
be done differently. Using indoor tactics outside can 
get you killed. 
I work with a training organization at Texas 
State University called ALERRT—Advanced Law 
Enforcement Rapid Response Training. ALERRT 
has an Active Shooter Response program that 
since 2002 has trained more than 50,000 law 
enforcement professionals across the nation. 
And the basic question we pose is, are you 
ready? Do your people have the tools and the 
training they need to respond to the types of 
threats I mentioned here? 
Finally, in my opinion, police and the news 
media should do everything possible to avoid glam-
orizing mass shooters. Many active shooters seem 
to be motivated by a desire for fame or recognition, 
so you will never hear me mention one of these 
people by name. It’s enough to refer to them as “the 
attacker” or “the shooter.” 
Chuck Wexler: Professor Blair, that was very 
informative. Can you summarize your advice for 
situations when the first officer or officers arrive at 
the scene, and you don’t really know what’s happen-
ing yet—do you rush in or not?
Professor Blair: Well, if you hear gunshots 
ringing out, we train our officers to go in. But we 
always say there has to be something driving you to 
go in, and the thing that drives you is that you have 
to have actual intelligence about what’s happening. 
You’re going into the building because you can hear 
gunshots coming from a certain area, and you’re 
going to move to that location to stop the violence. 
That is what we teach them to do.
Wexler: So you teach them when they arrive at 
an active shooter event to stop and listen?
Professor Blair: Yes, to get the intelligence and 
assess what’s going on. They need to stop for a sec-
ond, take a pause, and figure out, “What’s happen-
ing here? Where do I need to be? What’s the best 
thing for me to do at this point in time?” It’s not just 
jumping out of the car and running in with your 
guns out.
It only takes a few seconds. I’m not talking 
about sitting down there for five minutes trying to 
figure it out, but taking a few seconds to try to see 
what’s happening and decide where you’re going. 
We teach them that any time you have more 
than one officer who can go in, that’s always prefer-
able to a single-officer entry. But we also teach them 
not to handcuff officers and say, “No, you have to 
stand outside and wait” when they know that kids 
are being murdered in a school—because while 
you’re waiting, people are being killed. 
And so there is that balancing act. There isn’t 
going to be a perfect solution. There’s not going 
to be a single one-size-fits-all policy. It’s going to 
come down to the officer on the scene being prop-
erly trained and properly equipped, and taking a 
moment to make the decision and say, “This is what 
I think is appropriate in this situation,” and then 
being prepared to act.
Wexler: We have so many small police agen-
cies in the United States, agencies with only 25 or 50 
officers. Do those smaller agencies have a particular 
challenge with these kinds of incidents?
Professor Blair: Certainly they do. That’s one 
of the reasons we talk about solo officer entry. In a 
sparsely populated area there may be only one or 
two deputies on duty in a county that’s hundreds of 
square miles. It may take several minutes for that 
first deputy to arrive, and if he waits for backup, it 
could be a half-hour or more for them to get there. 
So yes, it’s definitely an issue because they don’t 
have the resources, they don’t have the manpower 
to show up. 
Wexler: The EMS issue is another major con-
cern. One of the things we noted in PERF’s research 
is that officers are trained not to deal with the 
injured but to go straight to the shooter. But psy-
chologically, this can be difficult to do, to just run 
past severely injured people. Is that right? 
Professor Blair: Yes, it’s a question of priorities. 
The first priority is to stop the killing. You have to 
stop the active shooter, so you do that before you go 
back and try to help the wounded. 
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Variations Found
In Policies on Active Shooter Response
PERF obtained policies and general orders 
regarding active shooter events from dozens of 
police and sheriffs’ departments of various sizes. 
In drafting their policies, some departments 
have incorporated certain elements from each oth-
er’s policies, or from guidelines offered by state and 
national policing organizations. However, each pol-
icy obtained by PERF appeared to be unique, and 
there were important differences on key points. 
Following is a summary of the different 
approaches that police departments have taken to 
some of the key issues.
ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS 
ARE DIFFERENT  
FROM HOSTAGE SITUATIONS 
Many departments’ policies begin with a state-
ment that active shooter incidents are fundamen-
tally different from hostage situations or incidents 
involving threats by persons who have barricaded 
themselves in a building or protected area but are 
not actively harming anyone. The critical distinc-
tion is that active shooters aim to inflict mass casu-
alties as quickly as possible, usually in a matter of 
minutes. Many active shooters do not target any 
particular individuals, but rather try to kill as many 
people as possible. 
Thus, active shooter policies grew out of a need 
for a much faster police response to these situations. 
“In active shooter cases, delayed deployment could 
have catastrophic consequences,” the Albany, NY 
Police Department’s policy states. 
Furthermore, some policies state that the pur-
pose of an active shooter policy is to reduce the 
inherent confusion that can occur when multiple 
agencies respond to a quickly changing, extremely 
violent event. Thus, a policy that is carefully tailored 
to active shooter events can result in a faster, better 
organized response that can save lives.
Many departments’ policies note that stopping 
the shooter must be an absolute top priority, and 
that rescuing or providing medical assistance to 
victims is a secondary priority to be addressed only 
after the shooter or shooters have been neutralized.
Many policies note that Active Shooter proto-
cols should not be used as a response to “barricaded 
gunman” situations. And some policies note that 
active shooter incidents are dynamic, and that an 
incident may go in and out of active shooter status 
in ways that could alter the police response. For 
example, a situation may begin as an active shooter 
incident, but if the shooter barricades himself in a 
room where he no longer has access to potential 
victims, and the police can secure that room and 
contain the shooter, the police response should shift 
accordingly.
SOLO ENTRY AND “CONTACT TEAMS” 
In active shooter situations where an officer arrives 
at the scene and can hear shooting, screams, or other 
indications that the perpetrator is actively shooting 
or threatening victims, some departments’ policies 
explicitly provide that the lone officer can move to 
stop the threat without waiting for any additional 
Variations Found in Policies on Active Shooter Response — 9
officers to arrive. The shooter may be stopped by 
arrest, by containment, or by use of deadly force.
And some policies note that when an active 
shooter incident occurs at a school, a School 
Resource Officer (SRO) may be the first officer at 
the scene who must make a decision about whether 
to respond alone. 
Other departments require that officers wait 
until a certain number of officers have arrived. 
Those officers are instructed to form a “contact 
team” that responds as a unit with the mission of 
stopping the shooter and preventing his escape. 
Some departments’ policies recommend a con-
tact team of a certain size—often four officers—but 
also specify that fewer officers may respond if it is 
apparent that a full contact team cannot be assem-
bled quickly. Some of these agencies caution that 
a smaller team should be deployed only as a last 
resort. 
Some policies provide that only one contact 
team should be deployed, and that officers who 
arrive at the scene later may join that contact team. 
Other departments call for multiple contact teams 
to be deployed quickly as additional officers arrive 
at the scene. If multiple teams are deployed, their 
movements and actions should be tracked and coor-
dinated by a designated commander, to ensure that 
they don’t unknowingly cross paths with each other 
or spend time on redundant searches, for example.
Some departments do not offer specific guid-
ance on how many officers should be at the scene 
before at least one officer moves to stop the shooter, 
saying only that those decisions must be made on 
a case-by-case basis, depending on circumstances.
Defining the role of contact teams: Many poli-
cies note that as a contact team moves through the 
location, searching for the active shooter or shoot-
ers, the team is “subject to 360-degree vulnerability,” 
because the shooter or shooters may be hiding any-
where. Policies offer guidance on various types of 
formations the contact team can use to reduce that 
vulnerability, such as “Rolling T” or “Diamond” 
formations in which a point person determines 
the direction of the team, two “flankers” or “wings” 
cover threats to the left and right, and a rear guard 
faces backwards and makes radio transmissions. 
A number of police and sheriffs’ departments’ 
policies list characteristics that are often 
associated with active shooters. The policies 
note that each incident is unique and that 
no list of active shooter characteristics is 
comprehensive. The characteristics cited in 
various policies include the following:
•	 Active shooters are likely to engage more 
than one target. They may target particular 
individuals or they may be intent on 
killing as many randomly chosen people 
as possible. Active shooters often go to 
locations with high concentrations of 
people, such as schools, theaters, shopping 
centers, or other places of business. 
•	 Active shooters’ intention is usually an 
expression of hatred or rage, rather than 
financial gain or motives associated with 
other types of crimes. Thus, police tactics 
of containment and negotiation may be an 
inadequate response to an active shooter.
•	 Active shooters often, but not always, are 
suicidal. Escape from the police is usually 
not a priority of an active shooter. Most 
active shooters have not attempted to hide 
their identity.
•	 Active shooters often have made detailed 
plans for the attack. Often they are better 
armed than the police. They usually have 
some familiarity with the chosen location. In 
some cases they have planned diversions or 
booby traps, such as explosives. 
•	 In some situations, active shooters choose 
a location for tactical advantage, such as a 
high, protected location. In other incidents, 
active shooters have remained mobile.
Characteristics of Active Shooters
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Many policies emphasize that members of con-
tact teams must remember that their sole purpose 
is to stop the shooter. It can be difficult to maintain 
that focus as officers encounter injured victims, but 
the policies indicate that helping injured victims 
may have to wait until the shooter or shooters have 
been stopped. 
Furthermore, some policies warn that victims 
often will be confused, in shock, paralyzed with 
fear, or unable to comprehend officers’ commands. 
Some victims may attempt to cling to officers, slow-
ing their progress as they search for the shooter or 
shooters.
Again, some agencies’ policies note that if the 
active shooter event is at a school, it can be very 
helpful if a School Resource Officer is part of the 
contact team, because the SRO presumably will be 
familiar with the layout of the school building and 
other critical information. If multiple contact teams 
are active, the SRO might be more useful as a coor-
dinator to guide the contact teams.
Some policies emphasize the importance of 
confronting the shooter as quickly as possible, in 
order to save lives. “DO NOT waste valuable time 
searching areas where you know there is no violence 
occurring,” a training bulletin from the Louisville, 
KY Metro Police Department states. “Go straight to 
the source of the violence. Use your senses to guide 
you to the location of the suspect. Go toward the 
activity you can see or hear. Go toward the sounds 
of violence. As you are passing potential witnesses, 
ask them for any information that might help you 
locate the shooter.”
Repeat radio transmissions: Many policies 
note that contact teams will encounter many dis-
tractions, including injured victims, noise from fire 
alarms and school bells, and activated fire sprin-
klers. Police leaders have noted that even expe-
rienced officers can find it difficult to focus their 
attention in the midst of so many distractions. Thus, 
they say, radio transmissions to officers should be 
repeated multiple times, in case officers are unable 
to comprehend instructions or information the first 
time it is provided.
Many policies also note that officers must be 
aware of traps or other threats that the shooter may 
have set, such as explosive devices. 
Off-duty officers: A number of policies note 
that plainclothes or off-duty officers who respond 
to an active shooter incident should remember that 
other responding officers may mistake them for a 
perpetrator. Ideally, police agencies should work 
together regionally to issue special apparel that can 
be recognized from a distance (such as brightly col-
ored baseball caps or windbreakers), which plain-
clothes and off-duty officers can keep handy in case 
they respond to an unexpected event, so officers can 
recognize other officers at a glance.
And plainclothes and off-duty officers at an 
active shooting incident should immediately hol-
ster their weapons after stopping a shooter, iden-
tify themselves, and comply with instructions from 
other responding officers.
RESCUE TEAMS 
As sufficient numbers of officers arrive at the scene, 
policies typically call for formation of rescue or 
extraction teams that locate and remove injured 
victims and help direct uninjured persons to safe 
routes out of the scene. 
Some policies note that rescue teams must 
remain vigilant, because the changing dynamics 
of the situation may suddenly put a rescue team 
in contact with a shooter, in which case the rescue 
team immediately becomes a contact team. Some 
policies note that Rescue Teams’ tactics will vary, 
depending on whether victims are scattered over a 
wide area or are in close proximity to each other. 
Some policies call for rescue teams to be larger than 
contact teams, with at least eight officers, if possible.
In addition to locating and rescuing victims, 
rescue teams are charged with gathering intelligence 
and relaying any useful information they obtain 
to other police personnel, especially information 
about the location or movements of the shooter or 
shooters. 
Variations Found in Policies on Active Shooter Response — 11
ESTABLISHING INCIDENT COMMAND 
Policies generally provide for designation of an 
incident commander who takes responsibility for 
establishing control of what is usually a chaotic 
and extremely dynamic situation. The Albany, NY 
policy emphasizes the importance of establishing 
control, saying, “A successful outcome can only 
be accomplished if command and control is estab-
lished early….The Incident Commander must dem-
onstrate clear, expedited and decisive leadership.” 
Some agencies’ policies require one officer to 
remain outside the scene of the incident in order to 
serve as the incident commander, even in the first 
moments of the police response. A commander is 
needed to control the scene, organize contact and 
rescue teams, brief personnel who arrive later, and 
keep the police department communications center 
informed about what is happening.
Many policies provide lists of the responsibili-
ties of the incident commander, beginning with 
performing an initial assessment of the situation, 
including whether sounds of gunfire can be heard 
and whether there may be multiple shooters. Other 
responsibilities include providing the radio com-
munications center with information about the best 
ingress and egress routes and other information; 
establishing one or more command posts; request-
ing resources; gathering intelligence from people at 
the scene; and establishing perimeters. 
Many policies contain detailed guidance on who 
should serve as incident commander. Some indicate 
that the choice can be based on rank, expertise, or 
seniority. Some policies note that high-ranking 
officers who arrive later should not take command 
from a lower-ranking incident commander until 
they have been thoroughly briefed on the situation. 
Some policies state that command-level personnel 
en route to an active shooter event may monitor 
the radio to obtain information, but they must not 
obstruct the ongoing intervention.
PERIMETER SECURITY AND 
EVACUATION ASSISTANCE TEAMS
Some policies provide that after Contact and Res-
cue Teams have been deployed, additional respond-
ing officers can be used to best advantage by giving 
them specific roles. Some policies call for officers to 
be placed strategically in stairwells, hallway inter-
sections, and other locations in order to isolate the 
shooter(s) and choke off escape routes. 
Some policies call for establishing a Perimeter 
Team—officers who create inner and outer perim-
eters in order to protect fleeing persons, cut off all 
roadways to the scene, and keep everyone except 
emergency responders away from the scene. 
Some policies note that the role of Perimeter 
Team officers is not only to keep non-emergency 
personnel out, but also to prevent any escapes by 
active shooters. Some policies recommend that flee-
ing civilians be patted down for weapons, in order 
to detect shooters who may attempt to mingle with 
victims in order to escape.
An Evacuation Team can take responsibility for 
the controlled removal of victims to hospitals or 
other facilities through designated routes that have 
been kept clear of parked vehicles or other obsta-
cles. Experience has demonstrated that an orga-
nized response to evacuation can make a difference 
in saving lives.
EMS PERSONNEL AND 
“ZONES OF DIMINISHING THREAT” 
Keeping in mind that the safety of Emergency Med-
ical Services (EMS) personnel must be protected, 
some policies have more or less detailed provisions 
regarding the establishment of certain zones at an 
active shooter incident, ranging from “hot zones” 
where the active shooter may be present to “cold 
zones” where there is little to no threat from the 
shooter or shooters. In between, the policies estab-
lish various categories of “warm zones,” “safety cor-
ridors,” and/or “safety zones.” 
The policies reflect a variety of local policies for 
EMS workers. In some jurisdictions, police have 
trained with EMS personnel and have agreements 
about responding to various types of incidents, 
but emergency medical personnel generally will 
not enter hot zones. By designating areas as hav-
ing lower threat levels, police can bring some order 
to the situation and help ensure that police rescue 
teams and emergency medical personnel can go to 
victims as quickly as possible. 
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The goal is to achieve the best balance between 
protecting EMS workers and avoiding situations 
in which injured victims bleed to death because of 
unnecessary delays in allowing rescuers to respond. 
(See sidebar on Arlington County, VA Rescue Task 
Forces, page 22.)
COMMUNICATIONS
Because active shooter incidents tend to be cha-
otic, effective communications are essential, start-
ing with incoming 911 calls. Some policies provide 
checklists of questions that 911 call takers should 
ask to ensure that they obtain as much useful infor-
mation as possible. These lists include questions 
about the description and location of the shooter or 
shooters, the types of weapons involved, the caller’s 
exact location, the number of people at the location, 
how many people are injured, whether the shooter 
was carrying anything or seemed to be wearing 
body armor, whether the shooter said anything, 
whether the shooter took any hostages, and so on.
Many policies also provide detailed guidance 
for communications among first responders and 
coordination of radio channels. Most policies note 
that all personnel must restrict use of the radio for 
emergency traffic only. Some policies note that it is 
important that members of Contact Teams and Res-
cue Teams should never need to switch radio chan-
nels while performing their duties.
EQUIPMENT
Some policies provide guidance on the use of equip-
ment in an active shooter situation—for example, 
stating that handguns and rifles but not shotguns 
are recommended for Contact Teams, or detailing 
the role of sharpshooters. 
The response to an active shooter at any given 
moment may depend in part on whether various 
types of equipment, such as shields, are available 
at the scene. So breaching equipment, shields, and 
other equipment should be kept “on the road, not 
in a closet,” as one chief expressed it. A number of 
active shooters have used chains to lock doors, the 
chief noted; so breaching kits should be carried in 
patrol cars.
SUPPRESSIVE OR DIRECTED FIRE 
PERF’s review of policies found that a few depart-
ments allow for “suppressive fire” or “directed fire” 
at a life-endangering threat, especially if the shooter 
has gained a position of advantage through height 
or barricade. Other departments’ policies prohibit 
suppressive fire. Most of the policies reviewed by 
PERF do not mention suppressive or directed fire.
According to a number of police executives and 
training experts whom PERF consulted, “suppres-
sive fire” is a term used in the military to refer to a 
tactic of sending large amounts of fire more or less 
indiscriminately into an enemy’s general location in 
order to force the enemy to seek cover. 
“Directed fire” is a more limited technique in 
which deadly force is aimed at a specific known 
threat in order to stop incoming fire from the threat. 
This may provide time for police officers to distract 
an active shooter, to take a new position without 
being fired upon, or to achieve another objective.
There was agreement among the experts 
PERF consulted that suppressive fire, as defined 
above, is a tactic of war that has no place in polic-
ing. A number of views were expressed about 
whether police officers responding to an active 
shooter incident might be trained to use directed 
fire. There was agreement that any such training 
must recognize that directed fire is deadly force, 
and that all the legal principles and training con-
cepts that police provide to officers governing 
deadly force remain in effect, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court standard that police use of force 
must be “objectively reasonable,” and the fact that 
each officer remains responsible for every round 
he or she fires. 
PREVENTING ACTIVE SHOOTER 
EVENTS 
Some departments have additional policies designed 
to help prevent active shooter incidents, by ensur-
ing that information about potentially troubled 
persons is shared within the Police Department and 
with other agencies. 
For example, the Duke University Police 
Department’s policy provides specific requirements 
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for handling reports of “concerning behavior” 
that come to the attention of university personnel. 
“Concerning behavior” is defined to include acts of 
violence, threats, harassment, intimidation, stalk-
ing, mental health concerns such as homicidal or 
suicidal thoughts, sabotage or destruction of prop-
erty, and erratic or bizarre behavior that generates 
fear (see page 29).
AFTERMATH 
Many policies provide detailed instructions for 
police actions after the threat has been neutralized 
and all victims have been given assistance, includ-
ing protecting and processing the crime scene, 
investigating the incident, and providing or man-
dating psychological services for police personnel. 
Depending on the number of people who are 
evacuated from the scene, police may be able to 
interview all evacuees at the scene. If there are too 
many evacuees to interview immediately, some 
policies provide that they may be excused from the 
scene, but only after they are identified and have 
provided contact information so they can be inter-
viewed later.
Many policies call for a command-level critique 
of the incident to be submitted to the Chief of Police 
immediately after the incident. 
And some policies call for School Resource 
Officers to conduct annual reviews of schools’ 
response plans, to ensure that they will not ham-
per police response to an active shooter incident. 
In addition, schools’ floor plans should be reviewed 
annually to ensure that any changes that are made 
do not increase risks to students and employees. 
TRAINING
Because there is no way of knowing which police 
department employees might be the first to arrive 
at the scene of an active shooter event, many poli-
cies call for training of all officers in the skills that 
would be needed to perform critical tasks. These 
skills and tasks include immediate assessment of 
an active shooter scene, room entry techniques, 
building-clearing, victim rescue, and recognition of 
explosive devices. 
In addition, advanced training should be con-
ducted on a regional basis (see further discussion in 
next section of this report, page 16).
SUMMARY POINTS ON POLICY DEVELOPMENT
As noted above, police agencies’ policies on active 
shooter incidents vary on certain points, often 
because the best response will depend on local con-
ditions. For example, police in urban or suburban 
areas may be able to assemble contact teams of four 
or more officers more quickly than is possible in 
rural areas. 
While policies will vary on some issues, other 
elements of active shooter policies are more univer-
sal. Following is a summary of active shooter pol-
icy issues on which there appears to be a degree of 
consensus among departments that have developed 
such policies.
The need for an active shooter policy: Active 
shooter incidents are fundamentally different 
from hostage situations and other critical inci-
dents, because of the extreme pressure on police 
to respond as quickly as possible to stop the kill-
ing and wounding of victims. In other types of sce-
narios, such as incidents involving persons with a 
mental illness who are behaving erratically or in a 
threatening manner but are not actively harming 
anyone, police leaders often urge officers to “slow 
the situation down,” ratcheting down the pressure 
in order to provide time for a response by officers 
and others who have specialized training in mental 
health issues. 
Unlike policies for those situations, active 
shooter polices are built around the reality that 
even a one-minute delay in responding may result 
in multiple additional fatalities.
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Solo response vs. contact teams: While all 
active shooter policies emphasize the importance of 
a fast response, policies also recognize that it is safer 
for officers to assemble a “contact team,” typically 
with four officers, who respond together to find and 
neutralize the shooter(s), rather than allowing offi-
cers to respond on their own. Many policies make 
a compromise by calling for the creation of contact 
teams, but allowing flexibility to use fewer officers if 
it appears that a full contact team cannot be assem-
bled quickly.
In some situations, because of the gravity of the 
threat and the amount of time needed for additional 
officers to arrive, immediate action is needed by the 
officer or officers who arrive first. Clearly there is 
greater risk if only one or two officers respond, and 
this should be undertaken only in the most extreme 
circumstances of life and death.  We live in chal-
lenging times that require police officers to make 
split-second decisions that often save lives, but 
regretfully sometimes cost officers their lives.
Regardless of how many officers are present to 
respond, some experts recommend that officers be 
trained to take a few seconds to assess the situation 
and their tactical resources in order to decide on the 
best approach, rather than simply charging into the 
scene.
Regardless of the size of the contact team, offi-
cers should focus on stopping the shooter as their 
priority, rather than assisting victims whom they 
may encounter as they search for the shooter. The 
priorities are: (1) stop the shooter; (2) assist the 
wounded; and (3) evacuate people from the scene.
Experts on police training note that some 
officers seem to have a mistaken belief that active 
shooters usually commit suicide before they can be 
confronted by police. In fact, as noted in the pre-
vious chapter of this report, only about 40 percent 
of active shooters commit suicide. In nearly half 
of the incidents, the shooter is shot or subdued by 
the police or by civilians at the scene. Thus, policies 
should recognize the danger and note that there are 
situations when officers must be prepared to risk 
their own lives to prevent further violence. 
Incident command: Like other types of critical 
incidents, active shooter events often involve a rapid 
response by many different law enforcement, fire, 
and emergency medical service agencies. Strong 
policies and training can help to ensure that despite 
the rapidly changing dynamics, an active shooter 
situation does not result in chaos. Establishing an 
incident commander and having a Unified Com-
mand structure with fire and rescue services are 
critically important. Rules should be established, 
and ideally should be agreed to on a regional basis, 
regarding who will take command, any changes in 
incident command as the event continues, and the 
roles and duties of the incident commander. 
Formation of secondary teams: As additional 
officers arrive and after one or more contact teams 
have been deployed, the incident commander 
should form additional teams for various purposes, 
including the following:
•	 Rescue or Extraction teams, which remove 
injured victims and direct uninjured persons to 
safe routes away from the scene.
•	 Evacuation Assistance teams, which help manage 
the transportation of victims to hospitals through 
cleared routes.
•	 Perimeter Security teams, which create perime-
ters to keep everyone except emergency respond-
ers away from the scene, protect fleeing persons, 
and prevent an active shooter from escaping. It is 
important to maintain clear lanes for ingress and 
egress.
Emergency medical response: Law enforce-
ment agencies should work with local emergency 
medical service agencies and fire departments to 
establish a clear understanding of how they will 
work together in an active shooter incident. EMS 
departments often have policies against their 
employees entering “hot zones” that have not been 
secured by police. A number of approaches are 
available to provide a nuanced approach that allows 
police rescue teams and EMS workers to designate 
certain areas of the scene as “warm zones” or “safety 
corridors.” Policies should be designed to balance 
the need to protect EMS workers’ safety while also 
avoiding unnecessary delays in bringing emergency 
medical care to injured victims. (See page 22.)
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Advanced training conducted in schools, shop-
ping malls, large industrial centers, churches, hos-
pitals, and other locations is recommended. Such 
training can teach officers to think about the secu-
rity assets that may be available in various locations. 
For example, at a shopping mall, closing of secu-
rity gates at individual stores can help to deny the 
shooter access to many potential victims, and some 
security devices may be operated remotely. Issues 
such as radio interoperability should be tested in 
training that simulates the stressful environment 
of an active shooting incident, because officers may 
not comprehend dispatchers telling them to switch 
their radios to certain channels.
Because active shooter situations usually 
involve multi-agency response, police agencies 
should strive for consistent policies, strategies, tac-
tics, terms, prohibitions, training, coordination, 
and radio channels/communications systems on a 
regional basis.
Other elements of a policy: Other aspects of an 
active shooter policy include coordination of radio 
communications and channels, contact and res-
cue team tactics, equipment, preserving the crime 
scene, briefing the news media, and providing post-
incident psychological counseling to officers.
Intelligence-gathering: Investigation and 
intelligence-gathering are an important component 
of responding to an active shooting incident. Police 
should use online sources of information as well 
as any witnesses at the scene who may be available 
to determine the shooter’s identity, where he lives, 
prior arrests or criminal record, any social media 
postings he may have made, whether he legally 
owns weapons, his driver’s license information and 
photograph to disseminate, etc. Security cameras 
at the location of the active shooting may produce 
useful intelligence. 
Training: All officers who could be called upon 
to respond to an active shooter incident should 
receive training in critical tasks, such as assessment 
of an active shooter scene, room entry techniques, 
recognition of explosive devices, and the roles of 
contact teams, evacuation and perimeter teams. 
In addition, officers should receive training in 
basic emergency medical care techniques that can 
save lives in an active shooter event, especially with 
regard to controlling bleeding, maintaining airways, 
and immobilizing fractured limbs. 
Experienced police chiefs and other experts 
strongly recommend that police agencies also con-
duct advanced training for active shooter incidents 
that includes multi-agency trainings, table-top exer-
cises, and realistic training in the use of firearms in 
an active shooter incident. 
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The Police Response to 
Active Shooter Incidents,
And Changes in Officer Training
This chapter presents comments that 
were made by some of the experts at PERF’s Active 
Shooter conference in Washington, D.C. 
Arvada, CO Sgt. A.J. DeAndrea:
No Question, We Now Train 
To Stop the Threat ASAP
Chuck Wexler: Sergeant, you were a team leader 
at Columbine. Can you set the stage for us? Look-
ing back at it now, what were the major lessons that 
police took away from the Columbine experience?
Sergeant DeAndrea: I think first and foremost 
that prior to Columbine, we believed that this kind 
of situation was a job for SWAT. Patrol would con-
tain the situation, control the scene, and contact the 
SWAT team. 
We realized that that’s not the answer. Active 
shooters are now seen as a patrol dilemma. We 
needed to get resources into that building imme-
diately to stop the threat. That is the biggest lesson 
from Columbine, and since then we’ve seen our tac-
tics evolve in ways that are designed to produce a 
faster response.
Wexler: In some ways, there was an unfair reac-
tion to how the police handled the Columbine inci-
dent, wasn’t there? People said the police were too 
slow to take charge. 
Sergeant DeAndrea: Yes, it was unfair, because 
at Columbine, the deputies did exactly what they 
had been trained to do when a call like that came 
out: They set the perimeter. And we thought there 
were six perpetrators, which of course slowed tac-
tics down. 
Today, we are training our officers to be much 
more aggressive, and to get into the venue and stop 
the threat. We’re teaching that in the Police Acad-
emy and then all the way through officers’ careers 
professionally. 
SWAT is a necessity as well, to have the equip-
ment and the skill level and confidence that they 
have been trained to provide. 
We all work hand in hand, but there’s no ques-
tion that we are trying to tell those first respond-
ers and supervisors to be much more aggressive in 
responding to the threat as quickly as possible.
Arvada, CO 
Sgt. A.J. DeAndrea
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Arvada, CO Police Chief Don Wick:
Changing Our Tactics  
Is a Continual Process
I think that Columbine was the event that focused 
national attention on the fact that we have a lot of 
school shootings. We know that our tactics evolved 
from that. I think that especially for those of us in 
Colorado, it was a key learning point, where we 
realized we can’t do it the old way anymore. 
And this is a continuing process. We have to 
constantly evolve our tactics. We have to under-
stand what the suspects are doing, how they are 
changing how they operate, and we have to be a step 
ahead and get better.
John Cohen, Principal Deputy Under Secretary 
for Intelligence & Analysis  
And Counterterrorism Coordinator, DHS:
It’s Important for Officers 
From Different Agencies  
To Receive Similar Training
Over the past three or four years, we have been 
working very closely with the FBI and others to look 
at past shooting incidents and search for precedent 
indicators, so we can provide additional training 
support to prevent these shootings. 
We also work on increasing security at loca-
tions that could be targets and identifying gaps in 
security. Quite a bit of training has been developed 
for the people who work in movie theaters, shop-
ping malls, schools, houses of worship, and other 
locations where large numbers of people gather. We 
focus on training those people so that they know 
what to expect and what to do if an event like this 
begins to occur at their place of work. 
We also work on issues of psychological recov-
ery, not only for victims and family members, but 
for first responders as well. 
One thing we have learned is the importance 
of consistency in training. In Newtown, for exam-
ple, there has been a lot of discussion of the benefit 
that was derived from the fact that across the state 
of Connecticut, police officers receive consistent 
training in how to deal with these situations. So if 
officers travel outside their jurisdiction and work 
with colleagues from other departments, everybody 
has at least the same baseline level of training. In 
other states, that’s not the case. In some states, offi-
cers are receiving different types of training, with 
different philosophical approaches to dealing with 
these situations. 
We’ve also been re-evaluating the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) and other 
response protocols, and the major takeaway from 
all these events is: Train, train, train. Don’t just 
train by yourself. Train with your fire department. 
Train with EMS. Train with everyone who responds 
to these events, so that we are all on the same page 
when an event like this occurs.
far left:  
Arvada, CO Police 
Chief Don Wick
left:  
Principal Deputy 
Under Secretary 
John Cohen, DHS
continued on page 20
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On Saturday morning, January 25, 2014, Howard 
County, MD Police Chief William J. McMahon was 
traveling in his car when he began to hear radio 
transmissions indicating that an active shooter 
incident was occurring in his jurisdiction, at a large 
shopping mall in Columbia, a suburb outside of 
Baltimore.
Chief McMahon made a quick U-turn and 
headed toward the mall, which was about 10 
minutes away. Other Howard County officers 
had arrived two minutes after the initial 911 call. 
The responding officers found that a 19-year-old 
man had fatally shot two employees of an athletic 
clothing store and had wounded a customer across 
the hall, before fatally shooting himself.
Chief McMahon and the Howard County 
Police Department received high marks for their 
handling of the incident, particularly with regard 
to how efficiently they disseminated information 
to the public and the news media as the event was 
unfolding and in the hours and days 
afterward.
It helped that all Howard County 
officers had received active shooter 
training, and that SWAT officers 
who arrived quickly had received 
active shooter training at the mall 
where the shootings occurred, Chief 
McMahon told PERF. McMahon and 
his Deputy Chiefs, Merritt Bender, 
Gary Gardner, and Lee Lachman, 
also had participated in PERF’s 2013 
Summit on Active Shooters.
In an interview, PERF asked McMahon if 
there were any lessons he learned during the 
Columbia Mall incident that have not received 
enough attention, and he said that police chiefs 
need to think about managing the response in 
the minutes after a call goes out. In urban and 
suburban areas with many police agencies nearby, it 
is likely that many officers will “self-dispatch” to an 
active shooter incident, which can complicate the 
situation, he said.
“As I was driving to the scene, my phone was 
blowing up with texts and calls from people telling 
me about the personnel and equipment they were 
January 2014 Shooting in Maryland Shopping Mall 
Tested Capabilities of Howard County Police
sending me, and I was fortunate that members 
of my own SWAT team were in the area and 
responding, and our Special Operations captain 
arrived quickly,” McMahon said. “We had officers 
on the scene within two minutes. At first, we didn’t 
know the extent of what we were dealing with, so 
you’re always grateful for the assistance. I was glad 
that I had plenty of officers. So for example I could 
just say, ‘Post someone at every entrance to the 
mall; we don’t want any more traffic coming into the 
mall,’ and there were officers to take care of it.” 
“But it wasn’t too long before we were fairly 
certain that we had a double murder and suicide, 
and we did not have any other shooters still 
roaming the mall,” McMahon said. “My SOD 
captain and I were working off the hood of my car, 
and I turned around and saw these waves of people 
in uniform coming onto the scene. So I grabbed a 
sergeant and said, ‘You need to get a handle on all 
of these people for me.’ In a situation like that, you 
have people from various ranks and a lot of different 
departments self-dispatching, so you need someone 
who is strong enough but also diplomatic enough to 
take charge of them.” 
“I’m going to discuss this issue with the 
Maryland chiefs’ association, because I think 
it’s something we need to address,” McMahon 
continued. “A lot of people will respond, so you 
need to manage them. It would be good to have 
an understanding that officers who self-dispatch 
to the scene will go to a staging area and wait to 
be assigned a role, rather than having people just 
do what they think needs to be done. If you have 
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people self-dispatching who are not in uniform, you 
increase the risk of blue-on-blue shootings, and you 
end up with more people calling the police to report 
that they saw someone with a gun, which can add 
to the confusion.”
USING TWITTER TO SHARE INFORMATION
The Howard County Police Department extensively 
used social media, especially Twitter, to share 
information with the public during and after 
the shooting incident. Public Affairs Director 
Sherry Llewellyn was on the scene and posted 
approximately 75 tweets on the day of the shooting. 
Following are a few of those tweets:
•	 There	has	been	a	confirmed	shooting	at	the	
Columbia	mall.
•	 Three	people	confirmed	dead	at	Columbia	Mall.
•	 People	inside	mall	are	being	asked	to	stay	in	place	
until	police	can	clear	each	area	safely.
•	 One	deceased	subject	located	near	gun	and	
ammunition.	ID	unknown.
Furthermore, the Police Department used 
Twitter to communicate with people who were 
taking cover inside the mall, as police established 
that the shooter was a lone shooter and the threat 
was over, directing the customers to stay in place 
and wait for officers to safely escort them from the 
mall, Chief McMahon said. 
In the days that followed, Ms. Llewellyn posted 
additional information as it became available, 
including news about the identity of the shooter and 
a journal that was found at his home, information 
about where the shooter purchased the shotgun 
that he used, a photo of the shooter with a request 
for information from anyone who knew him or saw 
him at the mall, information about the victims and 
memorial events, referrals for counseling services, 
and other information.
The Police Department also posted a number 
of photographs related to the incident, including 
a photo of the store after it was boarded up, with 
messages of thanks to first responders.
Chief McMahon and Ms. Llewellyn said 
that Twitter was particularly fast and effective in 
correcting erroneous information that other people 
were posting on social media, such as false reports 
suggesting that the shooter knew one of the victims. 
Twitter also was an effective way of disseminating 
information to the news media. Llewellyn was busy 
at the scene of the shooting, so she had another 
public information officer monitoring social media 
feeds and forwarding Llewellyn questions that were 
being posed or false reports that needed to be 
refuted. 
“We didn’t abandon traditional media,” 
McMahon said. “We held two press conferences 
the day of the shooting and two more the following 
day, and we issued traditional press releases. But 
Twitter and Facebook helped us get information out 
immediately rather than responding individually to 
the countless inquiries we were getting.”
At the same time, McMahon cautioned 
that police must take care to ensure that all the 
information they tweet is correct. People may think 
of social media as being less serious than traditional 
media, but stories in the Washington Post and other 
major news media cited the Howard County Police 
Department’s tweets as authoritative sources. “You 
have a well of credibility, but one mistake and you 
can lose that,” McMahon said.
•	 No	recent	reports	of	any	additional	shots	heard.
•	 No	indication	of	additional	shots	fired.	Scene	
believed	to	be	secure.
•	 One	subject	dead	is	suspected	shooter.	No	
information	about	other	victims	yet.
•	 MEDIA	BRIEFING	1:15	p.m.	near	Sears	at	
Columbia	Mall.
•	 Two	victims	with	minor	injuries	that	were	NOT	
directly	related	to	the	shooting	were	transported	
to	Howard	County	General	Hospital.	No	other	
injuries	reported.
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Aurora, CO Chief Dan Oates:
Columbine Was a Searing Event 
For Police Agencies in Colorado
Chuck Wexler: Dan, you served 21 years in the 
NYPD, then as chief in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and in 
2005 you became chief in Aurora, Colorado, where 
the Columbine massacre was felt most deeply. And 
then in 2012 Aurora experienced the horrific movie 
theater shooting. I understand that you cannot dis-
cuss the Aurora movie theater shooting, because 
you have a suspect on trial for it. But can you give 
us a few words on your general perspective on this 
issue?
Chief Oates: As an outsider to the Colorado 
law enforcement community who has only been 
there since 2005, I can tell you that Colorado law 
enforcement has been on top of its game since 
Columbine. It was a searing event for the police 
in Colorado. There was this sea change in terms of 
shifting away from the old strategy of “contain and 
negotiate.” I think everyone has a focus on the new 
paradigm and the new way of responding, includ-
ing my organization. We have really focused in the 
last couple of years on training for aggressive entry 
to attack the threat. That is a common theme. Colo-
rado was fundamentally changed by Columbine in 
a very powerful way.
Alexander Eastman, M.D.,  
Lieutenant and Deputy Medical Director, 
Dallas, TX Police Department:
All Officers Should Receive Simple Training 
In How to Stop Victims’ Bleeding
One of the things I’ve been hearing about is train-
ing officers in some sort of emergency medical 
response. We have to remember that 33 percent 
of officers who go in solo are wounded. And 100 
percent of these incidents have wounded civilians. 
So we must think about ways in which police offi-
cers can save their own lives as well as the lives of 
civilians. 
I think we’ve almost gone too far with it; it has 
become too complicated. You don’t need a whole 
day of medical training for your officers. In Dal-
las, in addition to our own department, we’re help-
ing the University of Texas System Police with its 
train-the-trainer program, and it only takes about 
one hour of initial training to make officers as profi-
cient as anyone at doing a very simple task: stopping 
bleeding. It’s not medicine; it’s not turning officers 
into EMTs; it’s not making them paramedics; it’s not 
Aurora, CO Chief 
Dan Oates
Dr. Alexander Eastman, 
Dallas Police Department
continued from page 17
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making them proficient in tactical medicine. It is 
just stopping hemorrhage, and it is simple training 
with simple equipment. 
So I ask you, would you spend an hour a year 
and $30 per officer for the chance that one of them 
would go home tomorrow from one of these active 
shooter events? I think everyone in this room would 
answer yes to that question.
George Mason University Police Chief  
Drew Tracy:
The Thinking Is Changing 
About Emergency Medical Personnel  
Going into “Warm Turf ” 
Since Columbine, the mindset has changed. You 
have to train and equip the first responders. And 
you have to work and coordinate and plan with the 
Emergency Medical Services people. 
Most of the EMS people are understandably 
concerned about going into crime scene areas 
known as “warm turf.” They aren’t police officers; 
they are not armed to protect themselves. So they 
want to stay in the cold turf. But you’re not going to 
get victims out quickly enough if you wait. 
So, one thing we do is train with responding 
EMS personnel at George Mason University to go 
into the warm zone with our law enforcement people, 
basically right behind the immediate action team. 
So once the immediate action team ends or neutral-
izes the threat, they’re there right away. Extraction 
teams can get in right away. In 2009, about 80 per-
cent of the fire departments in this country would 
not go into the warm zone. Now, the mindset is 
changing, to get into the warm zone and get the 
casualties out.
COPS Office Director Bernard Melekian:
Incident Command System 
Is Consistent with Active Shooter Response
Chuck Wexler: Barney, how does the police 
response to active shooters fit with the Incident 
Command System (ICS) that currently exists? ICS 
is a standardized system for coordinating the emer-
gency response to a variety of incidents, when there 
are many different jurisdictions that are responding. 
But who manages active shooter events? You may 
have one patrol officer arriving and taking action, 
and he doesn’t even have a supervisor at the scene. 
Bernard Melekian: I think you have to look at 
it in terms of the evolution of command. When that 
first officer gets there, he may evaluate the problem 
George Mason University 
Police Chief Drew Tracy
COPS Office Director 
Bernard Melekian
continued on page 26
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Like many public safety agencies, the Arlington 
County Police and Fire Departments began studying 
active shooter events a number of years ago. In 
August 2007, our departments conducted a joint 
exercise using a local university campus as the 
setting. 
Our exercise was realistic, and it highlighted 
numerous deficiencies. The main weakness was 
the staging of Fire/EMS assets for more than an 
hour while waiting for the “all clear” from police. 
It was clear that while law enforcement had made 
significant changes to their tactics in the wake of 
Columbine, Fire/EMS had not similarly adapted.
Immediately after the exercise, we resolved 
to come up with a better way. That way is called 
Rescue Task Force (RTF), and the main objective is 
to get medical care to victims within minutes of being 
wounded. 
POLICE AND FIRE/EMS RESPOND TOGETHER 
TO SAVE LIVES IN ACTIVE SHOOTER 
‘WARM ZONES’
RTF consists of the first arriving Fire/EMS personnel 
teamed with two patrol officers, who follow quickly 
into “warm” zones in areas that are cleared but not 
secured by police. Patrol officers enter a structure or 
area first, as contact teams, to engage the shooter. 
As soon as those officers assess an area as clear of 
the shooter, they communicate with command. The 
Rescue Task Force then deploys to the same area 
to provide care for victims, while the contact teams 
continue their search for the shooter(s). 
The police officers on a Rescue Task Force 
provide security for the detail, and their job is to 
constantly evaluate the situation for threats. They do 
not provide medical care for victims. 
It is important to emphasize that the EMS 
personnel who are part of the RTF are not tactical 
medics. They are regular firefighter/EMTs who are 
trained in Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC). 
TECC is the civilian adaptation of Tactical Combat 
Casualty Care (TCCC). TCCC was first introduced 
to the military in the mid-1990s, and has drastically 
Police and Fire Departments in Arlington County, VA 
Create Rescue Task Forces to Speed Medical Care
By Chief M. Douglas Scott, Arlington County, VA Police Department
Chief Jim Schwartz, Arlington County, VA Fire Department
reduced preventable battlefield deaths due to 
trauma in Iraq and Afghanistan. TCCC uses simple 
measures, including tourniquets and occlusive 
dressings that stop critical blood loss that can lead 
to death in minutes. 
As valuable as these protocols are, TCCC was 
developed and applied for a specific demographic: 
The military only takes healthy, physically fit people 
to war. The profiles of people in our communities 
who are potential victims of an active shooter 
span a range of medical circumstances, including 
geriatrics, pediatrics, pregnant women, and 
persons with mental or physical handicaps. For our 
operating environment, TECC is a better and more 
realistic fit.
As a deployed RTF encounters live victims, the 
EMS personnel apply appropriate TECC measures 
and then assesses the situation to determine if the 
victim should be moved immediately to a casualty 
collection point outside, or if that should be done 
by a second RTF, in which case the first RTF moves 
to another victim. These decisions are the result 
of a constant “size-up” of the situation and risk 
assessment being made by everyone on the scene, 
with information being shared through unified 
command.
In Arlington, every police officer is trained 
in TECC. Police officers are also equipped with a 
left: Arlington County, VA Police Chief M. Douglas Scott
right: Arlington County, VA Fire Chief Jim Schwartz
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“blowout kit” that includes a tourniquet, 
wound seal and combat compression 
bandage. This was done primarily in 
recognition that police officers themselves 
may be the victim of a gunshot wound, 
and either they or their buddy may need 
immediate care. 
Moreover, when responders are faced 
with numerous victims from an active 
shooter or other event involving trauma, 
there cannot be too many personnel with 
TECC skills and equipment. On a recent 
incident where police were dispatched to 
a gang fight, officers recognized the life-
threatening knife wounds that several of 
the participants suffered. Using their TECC 
training and equipment, the officers applied 
tourniquets and wound seals in advance of 
the arrival of EMS. 
All fire/EMS personnel are also trained in TECC, 
and each response vehicle is equipped with kits that 
include the tourniquets and compression bandages. 
When the Rescue Task Force is deployed, members 
carry a larger version of the kits that are made for 
use in battlefield-like conditions, and carry enough 
equipment for multiple patients.
THREE ELEMENTS OF  
RESPONSE TO ACTIVE SHOOTER
Numerous federal agencies, professional 
associations, and labor groups have developed 
guidance for response to active shooter events. 
Such guidelines are useful when based on 
thoughtful analysis of available evidence. From 
our perspective, a successful response to an active 
shooter incident must involve three essential 
elements:
•	 The first element is the prime objective of getting 
medical care to victims within minutes. Whether 
this entails Rescue Task Forces or another 
approach based on local capabilities is a decision 
to be made jointly by all the public safety agencies 
that may be involved in such a response. The 
foundation of this objective is to train and equip 
every public safety responder in the Tactical 
Emergency Casualty Care.
•	 The second element of a successful response to 
an active shooter incident is a commitment by 
agency heads that the response be integrated. 
Standard operating procedures should be 
developed jointly and exercised frequently. There 
must be a strong message from command 
officers that training and response to active 
shooter events will utilize unified incident 
command as described in the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS).
•	 Lastly, agencies must include in their program 
a commitment to continuing joint training and 
exercises. Incidents involving an active shooter 
are not routine events, so there is a possibility 
of “skill fade” unless there is a periodic refresh 
of local practices. In Arlington we achieve this by 
staging small exercises that involve one firehouse 
and a couple of patrol officers who are taken 
off the street for as little as 30 minutes to walk 
through the procedures. Senior-level officers 
from our departments oversee the training to 
demonstrate command commitment.
Additionally, periodic review of practices and 
procedures enables changes to reflect the ever-
evolving nature of these incidents. Each shooter 
seems to “learn” from the last active shooter 
incident, which elevates the level of difficulty for 
responders. 
There is little doubt that violent incidents that 
involve innocent victims will continue to plague our 
communities. And unlike many of the investments 
in terrorism preparedness that have been made in 
densely populated urban jurisdictions over the last 
decade, these events happen anywhere. We must be 
ready.
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On September 16, 2013, 15 people were shot, 12 fatally, in a mass 
shooting at the Naval Sea Systems Command at the Washington 
Navy Yard in Washington, D.C.  
Chief Cathy Lanier of the Metropolitan Police Department 
(MPD) in Washington provided the following summary of the 
issues and challenges the MPD faced in responding to this incident:
Shooting at the Washington Navy Yard
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department:
Identified Issues and Challenges
Metropolitan Police Department
Washington, D.C.
•	 Difficult to initially determine the exact location of 
Building 197.
Scene Management
•	 Size of scene; both the size of the base and the 
enormity and complexity of Building 197.
Witness Management and  
Investigative Response
•	 Thousands of potential witnesses; and
•	 Coordination with many other agencies with 
direct involvement in the response, as well as 
those agencies in supporting roles or impacted 
by incident.
Possibility of Multiple Shooters
•	 While the first description of the shooter was 
very accurate (provided by first 911 caller who 
witnessed shooting), several witnesses, callers, 
and the limited video from the scene provided 
conflicting or additional information that 
suggested the possibility of additional suspects.
Incident Command
•	 Although Incident Command was established, 
there are a number of ways it could have been 
more clearly developed (after the crisis response/
search for shooter).
•	 While most of the critical roles were established 
early in the response, there were various branches 
Building Structure and Environment
•	 Large, secure building housing naval engineering 
operations;
•	 Several Sensitive Compartmented Information 
Facilities (SCIFs) and classified operations;
•	 Complex, “maze-like” layout with thousands of 
cubicles and office areas, and extremely narrow 
hallways and pathways;
•	 Many areas of concealment (for shooter), few 
areas of adequate cover (for officers);
•	 Steel structure (affected the radios of some officers 
from other agencies) with two, large open atriums 
(affected ability to determine the location of 
gunshots); and
•	 Alarm was pulled by security and was sounding 
through the duration of the search for the 
shooter.
Emergency Calls
•	 Getting information provided by callers from the 
911 call center to the units in the field;
•	 Some operators stuck to a standard script, which 
frustrated callers; and
•	 911 calls made from landlines within the Navy 
Yard complex were routed to their internal 
communications center and not the city’s 911 call 
center.
Initial Identification of  
Location and Access to Base
•	 Some entrance gates to the base were closed 
and locked per longstanding base lockdown 
protocols; and 
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and functions that were not clearly or effectively 
established, and not all responding agencies 
reported to Incident Command.
Unified Command
•	 Too many command buses which diluted agency 
representation.
•	 Insufficient representation of all key agencies in 
Unified Command.
Communications
•	 Some officers had a difficult time transmitting 
vital information over radio channels.  There 
were numerous people transmitting on the 
main channel.  Additionally, the structure of the 
building may have interfered with the radios of 
officers from some of the other agencies.
Self-Dispatching Officers and  
Accountability and Tracking of Personnel
•	 Numerous officers responded to scene; many 
in plainclothes.  In addition, there were some 
personnel who did not have their credentials or 
badge conspicuously displayed.
•	 Difficult to determine who entered the building 
and who may have discharged their weapon.
•	 Handling Self-Dispatching Officers: The Forward 
Commander did a great job ensuring that the 
subsequent teams that entered the building were 
adequately dressed in uniform and protective 
vests.  He also communicated with the first 
team whenever a new team entered.  Thus, 
self-dispatching did not negatively impact the 
inner tactical response, but did likely create 
congestion on the outer perimeter.
Concern for Blue-on-Blue Engagements
•	 Over 100 officers, forming several active shooter 
teams, entered the building during the initial 
search for the shooter.
Providing Medical Support in a “Hot Zone”
•	 Evacuating injured from a “hot zone” and 
ensuring they are provided prompt medical 
attention.
Determining Who Was in Charge of Base
•	 Several different Navy command officials on-site 
and responsible for different buildings/facilities 
on the Navy Yard;
•	 Getting rapid access to floor plans, CCTV, 
decision makers, etc.
Demobilization
•	 A variety of factors made it difficult to track and 
manage the orderly and efficient demobilization 
of all personnel and resources. 
MPD Chief Cathy Lanier addresses 
the news media about the Navy Yard shooting.
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at hand and make a decision that he needs to enter 
that building, deal with the situation, and stop the 
shooter. Presumably, the officer will get on the 
radio and advise somebody that he’s going in. So 
he moves in and in effect he’s in command, inside 
the building. As the minutes go by, other police 
officers arrive and head into the building. And you 
may have a lieutenant who goes into the building 
initially, but then he realizes that he has a broader 
and more strategic responsibility. So he may go back 
outside and assume command. 
So I think that command is always fluid. There 
was one agency a few years ago with a policy stat-
ing that whoever was the highest ranking person on 
the scene was automatically in command. But that 
can have disastrous results if the highest-ranking 
person arrives but hasn’t been briefed yet and isn’t 
prepared to take command. So most agencies now 
have a formal process by which someone will say, “I 
am now assuming command.”
Cambridge, MA Police Commissioner 
Robert Haas:
We Have Done Active Shooter Training 
With Many Partners in Different Locations 
Our department has worked extensively with our 
community partners, schools, hospitals, and busi-
ness organizations to conduct training for active 
shooter incidents. We train in different types of 
buildings where an active shooter incident might 
happen.
Our active shooter training goes back to 1999, 
when we trained at the Blessed Sacrament School 
in Cambridge. The last few years, we have trained 
jointly with the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology Police and the Harvard University Police 
Department, at a site provided by MIT. Our Special 
Response Team has used the John Tobin Elemen-
tary School for active shooter training during the 
summer months when the school is closed. We have 
worked with private security, firefighters and EMS 
on active shooter training scenarios at the Galleria 
Mall. We used a Water Department site for a sce-
nario in which an active shooter invades a busi-
ness. And we have done a table top exercise with 
the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), 
hospitals and the schools. 
The Police Department also has partnered with 
the schools, LEPC, and the Cambridge Health Alli-
ance to build the “Be Safe” program, in which all 
the schools were electronically mapped and pho-
tographed, so emergency responders can quickly 
access the floorplans online during an incident. The 
planning process also updated the schools’ proce-
dures for lock downs, notifications, updated phone 
numbers, etc. We also have comprehensive map 
books in all of the supervisors’ cruisers of the Cam-
bridge schools. 
Our truly innovative program is the Safety Net 
Program, which involves training by the U.S. Secret 
Service in threat assessment. This complements our 
Youth Resource Officers’ daily activity of evaluat-
ing “at risk” children and behaviors, with the goal of 
early identification of youths before they reach the 
level of becoming a threat.
Cambridge, MA Police 
Commissioner Robert Haas
continued from page 21
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instructor, Brian Cavanaugh, is a veteran of three 
combat tours in Iraq and is the Tactical Combat 
Casualty Coordinator for Ohio and Indiana. Our 
training and equipment is approved by our Medical 
Director.
Sparks, NV Chief Brian Allen:
We Have Been Refining 
Our Response Since 1996
We have tried to take a 
proactive approach to 
active shooter response 
since 1996, when a dis-
gruntled employee went 
to his workplace and shot 
his boss and then him-
self. Since then, we have 
refined our in-service 
training for all sworn personnel based on what has 
happened at Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Sandy 
Hook. We have attempted to attend debriefings of 
national events to bring back to our agency the les-
sons learned from other incidents.
Regarding training, we initially taught a “Rapid 
Deployment” class to all sworn officers in 1997, 
focusing on a school environment. Since then, we 
updated our response to active shooters every two 
to three years in our required in-service training. 
This training is provided to all sworn personnel, 
and now we conduct this training annually. Mem-
bers of our department also attended a variety of 
active shooter instructor classes to keep up on the 
latest tactics and methods, most recently in Decem-
ber 2012.
We have obtained a great deal of equipment for 
these types of incidents. We have purchased AR-15 
style weapons for all sworn personnel. We have con-
verted all our patrol vehicle shotguns to a type of 
breaching shotgun. We have purchased tactical vests 
with ceramic plates that are placed in every patrol 
vehicle. Supervisors have rams/sledge hammers 
as well as other breaching tools in their vehicles. 
Medina, OH Chief Patrick J. Berarducci:
We Train Our Officers  
In Emergency Medical Care
Our plan is to respond 
immediately and make 
entry as officers arrive 
and confront the shooter 
without waiting for a 
specific number of offi-
cers to arrive. All our 
officers have undergone 
single-officer response 
training to immediately 
confront the shooter. As 
additional officers arrive, they will begin caring for 
the wounded with life-threatening injuries, and as 
manpower increases we will evacuate the injured to 
secure areas. Our officers will transport by cruiser 
immediately if necessary. 
Each of our cruisers and unmarked cars is 
equipped with entry tools, including sledge ham-
mer, bolt cutters and pry bar. We also have a level 4 
vest, an assault rifle and a pump shotgun in each car. 
We use the Tactical Combat Casualty Care 
program (TCCC) to teach all our officers the skills 
to immediately begin emergency care, rather than 
waiting for advanced care to arrive after the site 
is secure.4 The training focuses on major points, 
including controlling bleeding from extremity 
wounds or penetrating wounds to the chest, main-
taining airways, and immobilizing fractured limbs.
We equip all our officers with a personal self-
care kit consisting of a tourniquet and combat gauze 
called “Quick Clot” which they carry on their person 
in case they are wounded. We have created larger 
kits for every Medina police car, with enough sup-
plies to care for six people. Our cruiser kits contain 
a supply of chest seals, trauma bandages, combat 
gauze, tourniquets, and a quantity of nasopharyn-
geal airways to help maintain a victim’s breathing. 
We have partnered with Medina General Hos-
pital on the training, and they are supplying the 
various medical supplies for our kits. Our lead 
4. Additional information about TCCC can be found at http://www.naemt.org/education/TCCC/guidelines_curriculum.aspx.
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We are currently testing and evaluating additional 
breaching equipment to be placed in every patrol 
vehicle. There are also a small number of ballistic 
shields that can be utilized. We have purchased 
individual first aid kits for officers to carry on their 
person in case they are involved in a shooting. 
Prior to the tragic shooting at Sparks Middle 
School in October of 2013, we worked with our 
schools and the Washoe County School District 
Police Department along with the Northern Nevada 
Medical Center on our response to active assail-
ants. In our de-briefing of the Sparks Middle School 
shooting, we found that the response tactics by the 
Sparks Police Department and regional law enforce-
ment were sound; however, on-scene management 
of the incident could be improved. 
The Sparks Police Department is coordinat-
ing with the Reno Police Department, Washoe 
County Sheriff ’s Office, Washoe County School 
District Police Department, University of Nevada-
Reno Police Department, as well as our regional fire 
departments, EMS providers and other law enforce-
ment agencies to create a Regional Response Guide 
to Active Assailants. We feel this response guide will 
continue to improve our response to active assailant 
incidents not only in Sparks, but regionally.
Police chiefs and other experts at PERF’s 
conference made a number of suggestions for 
their colleagues to consider in planning for 
active shooter incidents:
Be aware of sensory overload: Responding 
officers at active shooter incidents have 
reported that they never heard radio calls 
that were made. “I had combat veterans who 
told me they were incapable of processing 
information,” one chief said; the stress and 
chaos of the situation made it difficult for 
them to focus. 
SWAT officers are specially trained to 
avoid “tunnel vision” and “audio exclusion,” 
but it takes practice to fight these phenomena 
in an actual incident. Incident commanders 
and others are advised to repeat important 
messages on the radio again and again, to 
ensure that officers on the scene will absorb 
the information.
Federal agencies can help with the 
aftermath of an active shooter incident: The 
local law enforcement agencies closest to the 
scene of an active shooter incident will usually 
provide the immediate response, but federal 
agencies will offer assistance—for example, in 
handling large volumes of forensic evidence. 
Police chiefs who have experienced active 
shooting incidents recommend accepting these 
kinds of aid, because the local agencies will 
be extremely busy with other aspects of the 
response that are best handled by local officials. 
The challenge of quickly sifting through 
inaccurate information: Like other critical 
incidents, active shooting incidents 
typically generate a great deal of incorrect 
information as they are happening. One 
of the biggest challenges for responding 
agencies and incident commanders 
is to quickly organize the collection of 
information so incorrect reports can be 
sorted out.
For example, many witnesses at the scene 
may telephone police and provide conflicting 
or unclear reports about the appearance and 
location of a shooter or shooters. So it can 
be difficult for police to determine how many 
shooters in fact are present. After a shooter 
is apprehended or neutralized, the response 
by emergency medical response workers may 
be delayed if police believe that additional 
shooters are still present. 
Use of social media:  Police departments 
can use social media such as Twitter and 
Facebook to disseminate information to the 
public and the news media during and after 
an active shooter event. Social media also 
can be used to communicate instructions 
to people who are taking cover and may be 
able to use smartphones or other devices to 
receive messages. Social media should be 
used in combination with other information 
tools, such as news releases and press 
briefings.
Takeaways and Suggestions
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Preventing the 
Next Active Shooter Incident
Participants at PERF’s Active Shooter 
conference discussed what they are doing to prevent 
such incidents. Many noted that most active shooters 
are mentally ill, but only a tiny fraction of persons 
with mental illness will become violent. Thus, mental 
illness alone is not a predictor of an active shooter. 
However, police can work with mental health 
agencies and others who come into contact with trou-
bled persons who express threats of violence, in order 
to help them obtain mental health care, and perhaps 
prevent a violent incident. 
Dr. John Nicoletti, Nicoletti-Flater Associates:
Active Shooters See Themselves 
As Avengers, Acting Upon  
A Real or Perceived Injustice
A very small percentage of people with mental ill-
ness are violent, and an extremely small percent-
age commit attacks like the mass shootings we’re 
talking about today. So mental illness is not a pre-
dictive variable. 
And yet, after an incident like Aurora or New-
town, you see all these news media stories in which 
everyone is focusing on mental illness as if it has 
predictive value. It does not. If you focus on mental 
illness, all you get is a huge number of false posi-
tives. We shouldn’t let mentally ill people get a gun 
into a high school, but how do you determine men-
tal illness? Does the person have to be hospitalized? 
How many days do they have to be hospitalized? 
Do they have to have a certain diagnosis? Paranoid 
schizophrenic, delusional disorder? Or do they just 
have to be in counseling? You can’t have a weapon 
if you ever talked to somebody in counseling? It’s a 
slippery slope we’re getting into, and it’s not helpful. 
The big disparate variable I see is perceived 
injustice. All active shooters see themselves as 
avengers, acting upon an injustice, either real or 
perceived. There is an element of narcissism. If you 
harm these individuals, they get this sense of injus-
tice and they get obsessed. The injustices can be 
motivated by personal triggering events, such as the 
breakup of a relationship, or work/school-based, 
such as terminations, suspensions, etc. 
“Insiders” and “Outsiders”: I divide mass 
shooting attackers into two groups. The ones I call 
“insiders” are on someone’s radar screen before they 
attack. “Outsiders” are not on anyone’s radar. 
Dr. John Nicoletti
30 — Preventing the Next Active Shooter Incident
With the insiders, one of the interesting things 
we find is that they had caught someone’s attention 
at the business or school or wherever the shooting 
occurred. Someone had noticed something that was 
unsettling about the attacker, but they had decided, 
“We don’t have to worry about this person.” 
You often find the word “just” inserted in the 
sentence, which minimizes the response: 
“He was just joking.”
“That’s just the way he is.”
“He was just having a bad day.” 
Some of the more recent statistics we have found 
indicate that more than 50 percent of these attack-
ers had broadcasted their intent. Some of them 
made remarks in person, and others posted state-
ments online. I don’t mean they said, “I’m going to 
go shoot this place up.” But they gave some sort of 
signal about what they were about to do. 
The insiders—the ones who were on someone’s 
radar—generally broadcast to the target, to the 
workplace or school they were going to attack. 
The outsiders—who were not on anyone’s radar 
before the attack—broadcast indirectly, to someone 
other than the target. 
So what can law enforcement do? Police are not 
usually the recipient of this kind of broadcasting. 
So the question becomes, “How can police inter-
face with the types of organizations that are often 
targeted?”
With schools, I think we’re already there, if you 
have school resource officers. These officers are an 
excellent source of information about students. 
But many of the mass shootings are at busi-
nesses, so the issue is how police can get involved 
with the business community the way they are with 
schools.
University of Wisconsin Police Chief  
Sue Riseling:
We Are Trying to Create  
An Early Detection System
What we find when we look at these situations after 
the fact is that there was always more than one red 
flag about the shooter. What we are doing now is try-
ing to find the red flags before a shooting happens. 
The key is information-sharing. People become 
concerned about a fellow student, or a co-worker, 
or a neighbor. To put the pieces together, we need to 
share information. Universities must respect federal 
laws dealing with students’ privacy, but every law 
has a safety provision that lets you exchange infor-
mation if it is a matter of public safety.
If you do good police work, when you are told 
about someone who may pose a threat, don’t stop 
with that one red flag. Find all the flags, and don’t 
just take what’s brought to you. Talk to the person’s 
neighbors, co-workers, or whoever might be able to 
tell you something.
When we identify someone who concerns us, 
we have a whole series of interventions that we put 
in place. And we’ve learned that you can’t just do 
an intervention and say you’re done. For example, 
if we do an intervention with a student and he ends 
up dropping out of the university, we need to track 
that student to where he goes, and share our infor-
mation with the police at the former student’s new 
location. 
We know that many active shooters build up to 
it over a period of years. Business people know that 
often it’s two or three years after they fire somebody 
that the person comes back to the workplace to “get 
even.” 
University of Wisconsin Police Chief 
Susan Riseling
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In our profession we do a very good job of find-
ing out everything about these mass shooters after 
the fact. We also need to study cases that may have 
been near misses—where an intervention worked.
Five Phases of Active Shootings: As I have 
studied this, I found that there seem to be five 
phases of active shootings. 
First, shooters seem to fantasize or are obsessed 
with other shooters. For example, the Virginia Tech 
shooter studied the Columbine shooters. So Phase 
1 is the fantasy phase, where they fantasize about 
what they can do.
The second thing they do is plan. If anybody 
thinks that a shooter just shows up at work one day 
with a gun and starts shooting people, that is not 
true. They think about it and plan scenarios. This is 
a highly premeditated action. 
The third thing they do is prepare. It takes time 
for a shooter to acquire guns, ammunition, in some 
cases Kevlar or IEDs, and figure out how to put all 
that together.
The fourth stage is practice—oftentimes they 
practice. They go to the location and study where 
they will park, where the doors are, whether doors 
are locked, the floor plan, and so on. 
So it’s Fantasy, Planning, Preparation, and Prac-
tice; and all of that is before the first bullet flies or 
the first bomb is placed. Then you have the 5th 
Phase. Some call it the Event Horizon; I just call it 
implementation.
Behavioral Intervention Team: At the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, we have a behavioral intervention 
team, combining all cases together, involving stu-
dents and staff.
The University of Wisconsin–Madison has 
22,000 staff and faculty and more than 43,000 stu-
dents. And the entire University of Wisconsin sys-
tem has 184,000 students over 26 campuses. So this 
was a substantial investment. But we know we need 
to invest in this, because we want an early detection 
system. We want people telling us about people at 
the earlier stages.
We have a team of people who look at all the 
cases that bubble up—and there are hundreds that 
turn up each year. We don’t mind getting “false pos-
itives.” We want to have a system in place in which 
we can identify people who may have serious prob-
lems, and get people into treatment, or advising, or 
counseling. 
Universities also have the ability in some cases 
to ban people from our campuses people who are 
not affiliated with the university. It’s like a restrain-
ing order that we can use. 
Over the last 14 years or so since Columbine, 
we have actively worked on this on a constant basis. 
We have put a tremendous amount of resources on 
detecting people who are in the first 4 phases.
In Wisconsin, we had a case last year where a 
man said very clearly that he wished to kill two peo-
ple. He had been fired from the university, and we 
believe he might come back to harm people. Work-
ing with the district attorney, medical professionals, 
and others, we were able to get him incarcerated for 
six months for disorderly conduct. Now he’s out, but 
during those six months, we did a lot of target-hard-
ening, obtaining restraining orders, and developing 
intervention strategies. 
So sometimes you need to just keep pushing, 
because there are people who are intent on hurting 
others. We need to be careful about not stopping 
our investigations too soon.
Kernersville, NC Chief Scott Cunningham:
We Had a High School Student  
Who Concerned Us
Chuck Wexler: Scott, when you were chief in 
Winston-Salem, you had an incident about a high 
school student who left a thumb drive in a com-
puter at school, and it contained disturbing images, 
is that right?
Chief Cunningham: Yes, we had an incident 
that we looked into. The thumb drive had a lot 
of drawings about death and knives. The school 
resource officer started an investigation. We worked 
with the local district attorney’s office and secured a 
warrant to search the student’s room and comput-
ers. And we found a lot more information on the 
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computer systems of the student. The parents even-
tually came to the realization that there might be an 
issue, and the student was removed from the public 
school system. We feel that we did stop something.
Chief Terry Gainer, 
U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms:
We Encourage People to Tell Us 
About All Threats or Questionable Incidents
Chuck Wexler: Terry, we know the shooting of 
Congresswoman Gabby Giffords and 18 other peo-
ple in Tucson in 2011 caused many people to sit up 
and take notice. You’re the Number 1 law enforce-
ment official in the U.S. Senate. What can you tell 
us about how you assess threats? In the aftermath 
of the Tucson mass shooting, I imagine members 
of Congress wanted more protection, or at least 
wanted to know what they should do to protect 
themselves and their staffs.
Chief Gainer: The Capitol Police have been 
involved in this for quite a long time. But after the 
shooting of the Congresswoman and murder of 
the others in Tucson, we did talk with the FBI and 
the Secret Service about whether we were missing 
anything in assessing individuals who might cause 
a threat. We know that the majority of the informa-
tion about these threats comes to the local officials. 
And we try to make sure that Congressional staff-
ers share information with us about suspicious or 
unusual behavior. 
Sometimes, a Senator or House member’s office 
will get a call or letter or a drop-in visit that is ques-
tionable, but the staff passes it off as, “Oh, that’s just 
crazy talk,” or “We know him; he always does that.” 
We try to make sure that they always get this infor-
mation to the Capitol Police, so we can put it in our 
system. We need to keep track of these reports, and 
know where people are and what they’re saying and 
doing. We have to resist the tendency for people to 
just chalk it up to “That’s life.”
Most of these people who come to our atten-
tion don’t need to be locked up, but many of them 
need to be evaluated. So we try to ensure that staff 
members share the information with us, and then 
we work with our partners in the Secret Service and 
the FBI to do evaluations. 
Wexler: What happens when you think some-
one may pose a threat? How do you handle it? Are 
local police agencies involved? 
Chief Gainer: Analysts at the Capitol Police 
run names through our own files and through other 
Winston-Salem, NC Chief 
Scott Cunningham
Chief Terry Gainer,  
U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms
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federal agencies that have files regarding threats. 
And then there’s an analysis of whether a potential 
threat needs immediate intervention—whether we 
need somebody knocking on the person’s door as 
soon as possible. The FBI will make a determination 
as to whether it reaches a federal threshold. 
And yes, if it does not reach a federal threshold, 
the Capitol Police will work with local law enforce-
ment, because some of these things are simply not 
a federal case. They can be handled on a local level 
with a county prosecutor or a city prosecutor, or the 
mental health system where the person lives. And 
getting the mental health establishment involved 
can help track these individuals.
It seems to me that the tricky part is that often 
the information only seems important in retrospect. 
In the aftermath of a mass shooting, we find out that 
the shooter has been rejected from the military, or 
that his fellow students didn’t think much of him. 
But how would we ever have been told about some-
thing like that in advance? And even if we had that 
information on our desks, what in the world would 
we do with it? 
U.S. Capitol Police Chief Kim Dine:
Police Can Build Awareness of the Threat 
By Educating Their Communities  
About the Police Response
One thing that the U.S. Capitol Police proactively 
did was put together a brochure to educate the 
Capitol Hill community and all our constituents 
about how we would respond to an active shooter 
situation. I think this type of proactive outreach 
approach is productive from multiple levels, as it 
makes our community more cognizant of the seri-
ousness of this issue, and thus more likely to report 
things to us that we need to know about, and it 
teaches people how we want them to best respond 
during these types of incidents. 
I think this kind of outreach often is done on 
college campuses. And I think it can also be done 
in municipalities, where you have thousands of city 
workers who need to be educated about how the 
police will respond if there is an active shooter inci-
dent in their workplace. This builds awareness of 
the issue and hopefully will result in a more trained 
response from government workers as well as the 
public. 
Hennepin County, MN Sheriff Rich Stanek:
President Obama Said Federal Health Laws  
Should Not Be a Barrier to 
Information-Sharing
Sheriff Stanek discussed President Obama’s Jan. 16, 
2013 report, “Now Is the Time,” which outlined his 
plans to ensure that federal laws are not interpreted 
as preventing efforts by medical professionals and 
police to respond to threats of violence. 
“We should never ask doctors and other health 
care providers to turn a blind eye to the risks posed by 
guns in the wrong hands,” the President’s report said.5 
The Administration later began the process of 
issuing Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) rules to address any unnecessary legal barriers 
under the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act (HIPAA) that prevent states from making 
mental health information available in the federal 
background check system for gun purchases.6
U.S. Capitol Police Chief 
Kim Dine
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And the President announced that HHS issued 
a letter to health care providers stating that “the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule does not prevent your ability to 
disclose necessary information about a patient to law 
enforcement, family members of the patient, or other 
persons, when you believe the patient presents a seri-
ous danger to himself or other people.” 7
Finally, on November 8, 2013, the White House 
announced a final rule implementing a 2008 law 
requiring insurance companies to cover mental health 
and addiction benefits at a level of parity with medi-
cal and surgical benefits. The White House said this 
rule is an important part of its comprehensive plan to 
reduce gun violence.8 
Sheriff Stanek: There was a study of the nine 
major shootings across the United States in 2012, 
including Newtown, Aurora, and Accent Signage in 
Minneapolis. The study found that eight of the nine 
shooters suffered from treated or untreated men-
tal illness, and in the ninth case, the shooter killed 
himself, and they weren’t able to verify a history of 
mental illness one way or the other. 
So that’s one point, and the other point, which 
the other sheriffs in the room will verify, is that 
about a third of the people who come into our 
county jails suffer from mental illness. 
As we have discussed before, privacy laws like 
HIPAA have been seen as preventing local law 
enforcement from getting the information we need. 
I thought the President was pretty clear in his report 
after Sandy Hook that federal laws won’t be barriers 
to public information as to mental health. I think 
that’s important.
Former Baltimore Police Commissioner  
Fred Bealefeld:
Even If Doctors Don’t Share  
Information with Police, 
Police Should Share Information  
With Doctors
There are very few people in this room who are doc-
tors, but as Milwaukee Police Chief Ed Flynn has 
said, if someone is swinging a knife around in the 
middle of the street, we know we’re dealing with a 
mental health issue. 
I think the real issue is that it is highly unlikely 
that doctors are going to share mental health infor-
mation with us. But why wouldn’t we share our 
information with them? 
Why can’t law enforcement turn over their list 
of people with guns to psychiatrists, school psychol-
ogists, and others who are treating these people? 
Hennepin County, MN Sheriff 
Richard Stanek
5. “Now Is the Time: The President’s plan to protect our children and our communities by reducing gun violence,” page 9. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh_now_is_the_time_full.pdf
6. “Progress Report on the President’s Executive Actions to Reduce Gun Violence.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/november_exec_actions_progress_report_final.pdf
7. “Message to Our Nation’s Health Care Providers,” January 15, 2013, from HHS Office for Civil Rights. http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/
office/lettertonationhcp.pdf
8. “Insurance Companies Now Must Cover Mental Health Benefits at Parity with Medical Benefits.” White House statement,  
Nov. 8, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/11/08/insurance-companies-now-must-cover-mental-health-benefits-parity-
medical-benefits
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A clinician treating someone for substance 
abuse will ask that person, “Are you living with 
someone else who has a substance abuse problem?” 
In a similar way, I think that medical professionals 
would benefit from knowing that people they are 
treating for serious mental health problems have 
access to firearms. 
Howard County, MD Chief William McMahon:
Police Don’t Often Disclose Successes 
In Interdicting Threats
On January 25, 2014, Chief McMahon and the How-
ard County Police Department faced an active shoot-
ing event at a major shopping mall in Columbia, MD, 
in which a 19-year-old gunman shot and killed two 
mall employees before killing himself. (See page 18.) 
Chief McMahon’s remarks below were made at the 
PERF Summit, before the Columbia Mall shooting 
occurred.
I think we haven’t done very much in telling 
about the success stories we have had in interdict-
ing threats. We’ve had a number of instances in our 
county in which we got information about a pos-
sible threat, or the school system got the informa-
tion, at 5 or 6 in the evening. When that happens, 
we don’t wait until school opens at 8 the next morn-
ing. We work on it overnight, and generally the kid 
does not go to school the next day. We don’t put out 
press releases about things like that, but I think it 
happens more than people know. 
I think that one of the big issues is that parents 
don’t mind talking about their children if they have 
a broken leg or an ACL or even a learning disability. 
But when we start talking about mental health issues 
and the intersection of that with drug use, people in 
the community are less likely to talk about it. 
So what is frustrating for us, particularly in 
this age of social media, is to find out that there are 
threats and information circulating out there, and 
when it finally comes to our attention, we learn that 
it’s been out there for a while. Parents and other 
adults have known about it and done nothing. We 
find that very frustrating. 
Former Baltimore Police Commissioner 
Fred Bealefeld
far left:  
Howard County,  
MD Chief  
William McMahon
left:  
Col. Danny Stebbins
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Target Vice President Brad Brekke:
Business Respect Police and Will Cooperate 
On Efforts to Prevent and Prepare  
For Shootings
Chuck Wexler: Brad, you’re a lawyer and a former 
FBI Special Agent and now you’re with Target. How 
do you see the role of business in helping to prevent 
or prepare for mass shooting incidents?
Brad Brekke: The business community is part 
of the fabric of a community. So businesses can work 
with their employees to prepare them for disasters, 
including mass shootings. This is somewhat chal-
lenging in the sense that most people think about 
mass shootings as a type of critical incident, but 
they don’t happen every day, so how do you go 
about dealing with this? 
I think we need to undertake more efforts in 
this area, and the way to do it is to build the bridges 
between law enforcement and public safety and the 
business sector. 
I think that in most locations, if a police chief 
sends out invitations to discuss this issue, the busi-
nesses will respond. Police chiefs are seen as a tre-
mendous authority, and they have the respect of the 
business community.
Target Vice President 
Brad Brekke
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What Police Should Tell the Community
The prevalence of active shooter inci-
dents has changed police thinking about how commu-
nity members should respond to a violent offender. 
Traditionally, police have instructed community 
members not to resist if they are confronted by a rob-
ber, burglar, carjacker, or other assailant. “Your wal-
let is not worth your life,” police officers say. “Do what 
the robber tells you and don’t fight back.”
However, active shooters are not motivated by 
rational considerations such as money; their goal 
is simply to kill. So victims must have a different 
approach as well. Some police departments have 
begun to teach community members to think about 
how they will respond if they ever find themselves in 
an active shooter incident.
 It is important for people to think in advance 
about how they would respond, because the 
extremely high stress of an active shooter inci-
dent tends to cause people to freeze. Taking action 
quickly, and taking the right kinds of actions, are 
critical to saving your own life and the lives of 
others.
A number of federal, state, and local govern-
ments have produced short videos to instruct the 
public about active shooters (see “Resources” section 
of this report for links to several videos). 
Some of these videos are shocking, because they 
include graphic depictions of victims being shot. But 
there has been little backlash from the public about 
the videos. Officials who have released these videos 
have said that members of the community under-
stand the need to obtain useful information about 
surviving such an incident.
Advance planning is necessary because experts 
have many tips that might not occur to potential 
victims in the heat of an active shooting incident. 
For example, a fire extinguisher can be an effective 
weapon for knocking down or blinding a shooter. And 
if many people are trapped in a room, they should 
spread out in all directions. That way, if the shooter 
points his weapon in one direction, people in the other 
direction can try to attack the shooter from behind. 
The videos usually instruct community mem-
bers to flee if they can, at the first sound of gunfire. If 
escape paths are blocked, the videos recommend that 
people lock doors, barricade themselves in a room, or 
otherwise prevent the shooter from reaching them. If 
that is not possible, the videos urge people as a last 
resort to attack the shooter—for example, by swarm-
ing him as soon as he enters the room.
At PERF’s Active Shooter conference, Prof. Pete 
Blair of Texas State University provided a brief over-
view of training on these issues that he has conducted 
at the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response 
Training Center.
Prof. Pete Blair:
Police Can Help Teach Civilians 
How to Protect Themselves and Others 
During an Active Shooter Event
In our training at the Advanced Law Enforcement 
Rapid Response Training Center (ALERRT), we 
note that the actions of the police are only part of 
the picture. Remember that on average, it takes 
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police three minutes to arrive on the scene, and 
another few minutes to locate and stop the shooters. 
So for at least the first few minutes of an attack, 
the potential victims are on their own.
The major message that we have for civilians is, 
“You are not helpless. What you do matters. And 
what you do can save your own life and the lives 
of others.” Our research found that many times, 
active-shooter attacks stopped because potential 
victims took action to stop the shooter directly, or 
they made it more difficult for the shooter to find 
targets. 
In other words, the actions of civilians can dra-
matically affect the number of casualties that occur 
during an attack. This is a message police can dis-
seminate. We are developing training programs for 
school resource officers on this.
It’s important to realize that most civilians, 
unlike police officers, are not trained to remain 
calm in critical situations. The stress of an active 
shooter event affects our central nervous systems in 
ways that severely limit our ability to perceive infor-
mation and make plans. I have written a book with 
several colleagues from ALERRT that explains this 
in detail.9 I’ll mention a few basic points here. 
Denial can waste precious time: First, con-
trary to the perception of people panicking in 
a disaster, research has indicated that it is more 
common for people to deny what is happening. The 
number one sign of an active shooter event is gun-
fire, but in many active shooter events, people have 
reported that they delayed taking action because 
they thought the sound was firecrackers. But how 
often have you heard firecrackers at your place of 
employment or at school?
To overcome denial, we advise people to have 
a simple rule: If you hear something that could be 
gunfire, skip the denial stage, treat the sound as 
gunfire, and take immediate action.
Even after people recognize a threat, it can be 
very difficult for them to think clearly. Police offi-
cers involved in shootings or other violent counters 
have reported experiencing tunnel vision, audio 
exclusion (not hearing what is happening), out-
of-body experiences (feeling you are outside your 
body watching the event happen), reduced motor 
skills, and other side effects.
Do not freeze, and remember that the situ-
ation is not hopeless: People can use willpower 
and other skills to mitigate these side effects. It is 
important not to freeze, because in case after case, 
people who froze in place or attempted to play dead 
(a form of freezing) were attacked by the shooter. 
Taking any action can help restore some sense of 
control and reduce the stress that resulted in the 
person “freezing.”
At ALERRT, we teach a system we call Avoid, 
Deny, Defend. 
“Avoid” means getting far away from the 
shooter. This may mean several blocks away, to 
ensure that the shooter cannot shoot at you from 
inside the building or from a new location. 
If it is impossible to leave your current location, 
“Deny” means taking actions to deny the shooter 
access to your location. This means things like 
9. Active Shooter Events and Response. Blair, Nichols, Burns and Curnutt. 2013. CRC Press. http://www.amazon.com/
Active-Shooter-Events-Response-Blair/dp/1466512296
Prof. J. Pete Blair, 
Texas State University
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locking doors, using furniture to barricade a door, 
turning off lights, and being quiet so the shooter 
will not hear you. 
Often, however, doors do not have locks, and 
they open outward and cannot be barricaded. So if 
you cannot deny the shooter access, the only option 
left is to “Defend.” 
Even if the attacker has a gun and you do not 
have a weapon, the situation is not hopeless. There 
have been many active shooter events where people 
on the scene were able to subdue the attacker and 
save their own lives. We teach civilians to swarm the 
shooter and use other tactics, such as positioning 
themselves near the door but out of sight, so they 
can try to take the gun away from the shooter as 
soon as he enters.
The effectiveness of these principles was dem-
onstrated in our analysis of the Virginia Tech active 
shooter event of 2007. In that incident, the shooter 
attacked or attempted to attack five classrooms. The 
people in each classroom responded in different 
ways. In the room that was attacked first and where 
no defensive actions were taken, 92 percent of the 
people were shot. In another room, where students 
had time to push a large desk against the door and 
hold it there, the shooter fired through the door, but 
no one was shot.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Brochure 
Educates the Public about Active Shooter Incidents
HOW TO RESPOND 
WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR 
VICINITY 
1. EVACUATE 
• Have an escape route and plan in mind 
• Leave your belongings behind 
• Keep your hands visible 
2. HIDE OUT 
• Hide in an area out of the shooter’s view 
• Block entry to your hiding place and lock
the doors 
• Silence your cell phone and/or pager 
3. TAKE ACTION 
• As a last resort and only when your life is 
in imminent danger 
• Attempt to incapacitate the shooter 
• Act with physical aggression and throw
items at the active shooter 
HOW TO RESPOND 
WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES 
• Remain calm and follow instructions 
• Put down any items in your hands (i.e., 
bags, jackets) 
• Raise hands and spread ﬁngers 
• Keep hands visible at all times 
• Avoid quick movements toward ofﬁcers 
such as holding on to them for safety 
• Avoid pointing, screaming or yelling 
• Do not stop to ask ofﬁcers for help or 
direction when evacuating 
INFORMATION 
YOU SHOULD PROVIDE TO LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OR 911 OPERATOR 
• Location of the active shooter 
• Number of shooters 
• Physical description of shooters 
• Number and type of weapons held by
shooters 
• Number of potential victims at the location 
CALL 911 WHEN IT  
IS SAFE TO DO SO 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_pocket_card.pdf
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Conclusion
The police response to active shooter 
incidents began to change following the Columbine 
High School massacre of 1999, and policies and 
practices are continuing to evolve.
Active shooter incidents, perhaps more than 
any other type of crime, impose an extreme stress 
on responding police officers. In most situations, 
police chiefs urge their officers to exercise caution 
and never let down their guard. Active shooter poli-
cies recommend that officers rush to the sound of 
gunfire, even though statistics show that doing so 
is dangerous. 
In many ways, the challenge of active shooter 
incidents is daunting. The incidents usually are 
over in a matter of minutes, and it only takes a few 
minutes for many victims to be killed or wounded. 
Some persons with mental illness seem to have 
little difficulty obtaining powerful firearms and 
large quantities of ammunition. And the experts at 
PERF’s conference told us that there are no simple 
ways to predict which types of persons with mental 
illness are likely to become mass shooters.
However, the experts also told us that much 
work can be done to prevent mass shootings. 
Analyses of past active shooters demonstrate that 
active shooters do not simply “snap” one day and 
start shooting; they build up to it over months 
or years. And along the way, they often say or do 
things that seem odd or alarming to the people 
around them. So police executives are working 
with other agencies to “connect the dots”—to share 
information about persons who are experiencing 
mental health issues, and to help provide them with 
the treatment they need. 
It is impossible to know how many of these 
interventions—helping troubled people before they 
reach the point of violence—may have prevented 
mass shooting incidents. But police officials believe 
it does happen.
Police also are changing their policies, increas-
ing training, and working with their communities 
to reduce the number of victims when mass shoot-
ings do occur. The most sweeping changes in this 
area are the new policies and practices about what 
officers do when they arrive at an active shooting 
scene. Today’s police departments focus on stopping 
the shooter as quickly as possible, with fast action 
by the officers who arrive first, rather than waiting 
for SWAT teams to arrive. Speeding the response by 
even a minute or two can result in many lives being 
saved. 
Police also are taking the lead in educating 
the public and encouraging community members 
to think about how they will behave if they ever 
encounter an active shooter. This is important, 
because the natural instinct in a dangerous, high-
stress situation is to refuse to believe it is happening, 
to freeze, or to make bad decisions, such as “play-
ing dead” and hoping the shooter will be fooled. 
An active shooter incident is fundamentally differ-
ent from other crimes, and calls for a more active 
response from potential victims as well as the police.
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Resources
Active Shooter Events and Response. 
Blair, Nichols, Burns and Curnutt. 2013. 
CRC Press. http://www.amazon.com/
Active-Shooter-Events-Response-Blair/
dp/1466512296
FEDERAL RESOURCES
U.S. Department of Homeland Security webpage 
on Active Shooter Preparedness. This website 
includes links to a variety of DHS resources, 
including training provided by the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Centers; an independent 
study course for the public about preparing for an 
active shooter crisis; booklets, posters, and a video; 
and U.S. Secret Service research. http://www.dhs.
gov/active-shooter-preparedness
VIDEOS
“Run.Hide. Fight. Surviving an Active Shooter 
Event.” Produced by the City of Houston. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_
embedded&v=5VcSwejU2D0
“Preventing Mass Casualty Shootings in a 
Campus Setting.” University of Wisconsin. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SPyMrPz7jr0& 
feature=player_embedded
“Active Shooter Situation: Options for 
Consideration.” U.S Department of Homeland 
Security. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oI5Eo
WBRYmo&feature=youtu.be
REPORTS
“Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial 
District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy 
Hook Elementary School.” Office of the State’s 
Attorney, Judicial District of Danbury. November 
25, 2013. http://www.ct.gov/csao/cwp/view.
asp?q=535784
“Newtown Police Response to the Sandy Hook 
Elementary School Shooting.” A report by the 
Connecticut Police Chiefs Association. December 
5, 2013. http://www.cpcanet.org/site/assets/
files/1144/cpca_newtown_report_final.pdf
“Improving Survival from Active Shooter 
Events: The Hartford Consensus.” A report by 
the American College of Surgeons that describes 
methods for minimizing the loss of life in active 
shooter incidents, including early hemorrhage 
control. http://bulletin.facs.org/2013/06/
improving-survival-from-active-shooter-events/
“Gun Violence: Prediction, Prevention, and 
Policy.” A report by the American Psychological 
Association. December 12, 2013. http://www.apa.
org/pubs/info/reports/gun-violence-prevention.aspx
“Active Shooter: Recommendations and 
Analysis for Risk Mitigation.” New York City 
Police Department. This 184-page report includes 
a compendium of 281 active shooter incidents 
between 1966 and 2010. http://www.nyc.gov/
html/nypd/downloads/pdf/counterterrorism/
ActiveShooter.pdf
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Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood.” 
Report of the Department of Defense Independent 
Review. August 20, 2010. http://www.defense.gov/
releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13816
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES
“With Safe2Tell, emotional crises may be kept 
from escalating to school violence.” The Denver 
Post. December 24, 2013. http://www.denverpost.
com/news/ci_24785450/early-reporting-may-stop-
emotional-crises-from-escalating
“A Plea to Deny Gunmen Their Quest for 
Infamy.” New York Times. December 20, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/us/a-plea-to-
deny-gunmen-their-quest-for-infamy.html?hp
“Behind the Bloodshed: The Untold Story 
of America’s Mass Killings.” USA Today. 
December 10, 2013. http://usatoday30.usatoday.
com/news/nation/mass-killings/index.html#title
“Rules to Require Equal Coverage for Mental 
Ills.” New York Times. November 8, 2013. http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/us/politics/
rules-to-require-equal-coverage-for-mental-ills.
html?_r=0&pagewanted=all
“With mass shootings on rise, Holder calls for 
better police training.” Philly.com. October 23, 
2013. http://articles.philly.com/2013-10-23/
news/43291234_1_holder-justice-department-
washington-navy-yard
“Gun-control advocates see 5150 holds as 
model.” California’s “5150” hold for people in 
psychiatric crisis is being looked at by national 
gun-control advocates and some experts as a way 
to get help for mass shooters before they open fire. 
SFGate.com. October 12, 2013. http://www.sfgate.
com/crime/article/Gun-control-advocates-see-
5150-holds-as-model-4891244.php
“National Tactical Officers Association Calls 
for Increased Emergency Medical Training for 
Police Officers.” NTOA Press Release. October 8, 
2013. http://ntoa.org/site/current-news/ntoa-calls-
for-increased-emergency-medical-training-for-
police-officers.html
“In shift, police advise taking an active role to 
counter mass attacks.” New York Times. April 6, 
2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/us/
in-a-shift-police-advise-taking-an-active-role-to-
counter-mass-attacks.html?pagewanted=all
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About the Police Executive
Research Forum
The Police Executive Research Forum 
(PERF) is an independent research organization 
that focuses on critical issues in policing. Since its 
founding in 1976, PERF has identified best practices 
on fundamental issues such as reducing police use 
of force; developing community policing and prob-
lem-oriented policing; using technologies to deliver 
police services to the community; and developing 
and assessing crime reduction strategies.
PERF strives to advance professionalism in 
policing and to improve the delivery of police ser-
vices through the exercise of strong national lead-
ership; public debate of police and criminal justice 
issues; and research and policy development.
The nature of PERF’s work can be seen in the 
titles of a sample of PERF’s reports over the last 
decade. 
•	 Social Media and Tactical Considerations for Law 
Enforcement (2013)
•	 Compstat: Its Origins, Evolution, and Future in 
Law Enforcement Agencies (2013)
•	 Civil Rights Investigations of Local Police: Lessons 
Learned (2013)
•	 A National Survey of Eyewitness Identification 
Procedures in Law Enforcement Agencies (2013)
•	 An Integrated Approach to De-Escalation and 
Minimizing Use of Force (2012)
•	 Improving the Police Response to Sexual Assault 
(2012)
•	 How Are Innovations in Technology Transforming 
Policing? (2012)
•	 Voices from Across the Country: Local Law 
Enforcement Officials Discuss the Challenges of 
Immigration Enforcement (2012)
•	 2011 Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines (2011)
•	 Managing Major Events: Best Practices from the 
Field (2011)
•	 It’s More Complex than You Think: A Chief ’s Guide 
to DNA (2010)
•	 Guns and Crime: Breaking New Ground By Focus-
ing on the Local Impact (2010)
•	 Gang Violence: The Police Role in Developing 
Community-Wide Solutions (2010)
•	 The Stop Snitching Phenomenon: Breaking the 
Code of Silence (2009)
•	 Violent Crime in America: What We Know About 
Hot Spots Enforcement (2008)
•	 Promoting Effective Homicide Investigations 
(2007)
•	 “Good to Great” Policing: Application of Business 
Management Principles in the Public Sector (2007)
•	 Police Management of Mass Demonstrations: Iden-
tifying Issues and Successful Approaches (2006)
•	 Strategies for Intervening with Officers through 
Early Intervention Systems: A Guide for Front-
Line Supervisors (2006)
•	 Managing a Multi-Jurisdiction Case: Identifying 
Lessons Learned from the Sniper Investigation 
(2004)
•	 Community Policing: The Past, Present and Future 
(2004)
•	 Racially Biased Policing: A Principled Response 
(2001)
In addition to conducting research and pub-
lishing reports on our findings, PERF conducts 
management studies of individual law enforcement 
agencies; educates hundreds of police officials each 
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year in a three-week executive development pro-
gram; and provides executive search services to 
governments that wish to conduct national searches 
for their next police chief.
All of PERF’s work benefits from PERF’s status 
as a membership organization of police officials, 
who share information and open their agencies to 
research and study. PERF members also include 
academics, federal government leaders, and others 
with an interest in policing and criminal justice.
All PERF members must have a four-year col-
lege degree and must subscribe to a set of founding 
principles, emphasizing the importance of research 
and public debate in policing, adherence to the 
Constitution and the highest standards of ethics 
and integrity, and accountability to the communi-
ties that police agencies serve.
PERF is governed by a member-elected Presi-
dent and Board of Directors and a Board-appointed 
Executive Director.
To learn more about PERF, visit www.policeforum.org.
We provide progress in policing.
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About Motorola Solutions and the 
Motorola Solutions Foundation
Motorola Solutions is a leading provider 
of mission-critical communication products and 
services for enterprise and government customers. 
Through leading-edge innovation and communica-
tions technology, it is a global leader that enables 
its customers to be their best in the moments that 
matter.
Motorola Solutions serves both enterprise and 
government customers with core markets in public 
safety government agencies and commercial enter-
prises. Our leadership in these areas includes public 
safety communications from infrastructure to appli-
cations and devices such as radios as well as task 
specific mobile computing devices for enterprises. 
We produce advanced data capture devices such as 
barcode scanners and RFID (radio-frequency iden-
tification) products for business. We make profes-
sional and commercial two-way radios for a variety 
of markets, and we also bring unlicensed wireless 
broadband capabilities and wireless local area net-
works—or WLAN—to retail enterprises. 
The Motorola Solutions Foundation is the char-
itable and philanthropic arm of Motorola Solutions. 
With employees located around the globe, Motorola 
Solutions seeks to benefit the communities where 
it operates. We achieve this by making strategic 
grants, forging strong community partnerships, and 
fostering innovation. The Motorola Solutions Foun-
dation focuses its funding on public safety, disaster 
relief, employee programs and education, espe-
cially science, technology, engineering and math 
programming. 
Motorola Solutions is a company of engineers 
and scientists, with employees who are eager to 
encourage the next generation of inventors. Hun-
dreds of employees volunteer as robotics club 
mentors, science fair judges and math tutors. Our 
“Innovators” employee volunteer program pairs a 
Motorola Solutions employee with each of the non-
profits receiving Innovation Generation grants, pro-
viding ongoing support for grantees beyond simply 
funding their projects.
For more information on Motorola Solutions Corporate and Foundation giving, 
visit www.motorolasolutions.com/giving.
For more information on Motorola Solutions, visit www.motorolasolutions.com.
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